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Abstract 
Europe is increasingly required to assume greater responsibility for its own 
well-being and security. The debate about strengthening Europe’s ability 
to exert influence and act on its interests revolves around concepts such as 
strategic autonomy and – above all in France – European sovereignty. But 
rarely are these terms defined, or their political and practical implications 
explained. 
In this publication strategic autonomy is defined as the ability to set 
priorities and make decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, 
together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry 
these through – in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone. This 
understanding encompasses the entire spectrum of foreign policy and secu-
rity, and not just the dimension of defence. Autonomy is always relative. 
Politically it means growing readiness, a process rather than a condition. 
Autonomy means neither autarchy nor isolation, nor rejection of alliances. 
It is not an end in itself, but a means to protect and promote values and 
interests. 
The authors of this collaborative study offer more than definitions. They 
explore what Germany needs to do, on its own and in cooperation with its 
European partners, to achieve greater strategic autonomy. What difficulties 
and conflicts of goals are to be expected. What is necessary and urgent? 
What is possible at all? What resources will Germany and Europe need to 
commit? What red lines will Germany encounter in its own internal politics 
and among its partners? And which questions will need further political dis-
cussion? 
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Doubts about the reliability of the United States have 
injected urgency into the discussion about how, and 
to what extent, Europe can and should take its fate 
into its own hands (Chancellor Angela Merkel). The 
German and European discussion about Europe’s 
responsibility for its own well-being, security, and 
international influence revolves around terms like 
“strategic autonomy” and – above all in France – 
“European sovereignty”. Yet the concepts are rarely 
defined, and their political and practical implications 
usually left unstated. It is time for a more thorough 
discussion, not only on account of developments in 
the United States, but also in light of multiple emerg-
ing threats to the rules-based multilateral order. Up-
holding and developing the latter represents a vital 
interest for Germany and Europe. 
Defining the Terms 
As well as offering an operationalised definition of 
the key concept, we also ask what Germany needs 
to do – on its own and in cooperation with its Euro-
pean partners – in order to achieve greater strategic 
autonomy or sovereignty for Europe, and what ob-
stacles, difficulties and conflicts of goals are to be 
expected. What is necessary and urgent? What is pos-
sible at all? What material and political resources will 
Germany and Europe need to commit? What red lines 
will Germany in particular encounter in its own 
internal politics and among its partners? And which 
questions will need further political discussion? 
Fundamentally, we understand strategic autonomy 
as the ability to set one’s own priorities and make 
one’s own decisions in matters of foreign policy and 
security, together with the institutional, political and 
material wherewithal to carry these through – in 
cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone. 
Strong strategic autonomy means being able to set, 
modify and enforce international rules, as opposed to 
(unwillingly) obeying rules set by others. The opposite 
of strategic autonomy is being a rule-taker subject to 
strategic decisions made by others: the United States, 
China or Russia. Germany can achieve strategic autono-
my only in concert with its European partners. 
Our understanding of strategic autonomy thus 
encompasses the entire spectrum of foreign policy 
and security, and not just the dimension of defence. 
Autonomy is – like the related term power – rela-
tional, in the sense that it is realised in relation to 
others. It may represent an objective but is not an end 
in itself; rather it is a means to protect and promote 
values and interests. Politically, this is about an in-
crease in autonomy, a process of gradual autonomisa-
tion, rather than an absolute condition. Autonomy 
means neither autarchy nor isolation, nor rejection 
of alliances. An autonomous actor decides on its own, 
on the basis of its own priorities, with which other 
actors it wishes to seek partnerships and alliances. In 
an interdependent world autarchy is neither possible 
nor desirable. Partners are essential for protecting and 
promoting values and interests. For Germany these 
are primarily the European Union and its members, 
with which it shares the project of European integra-
tion, and the other European NATO states. 
Relevance and Purpose of 
Strategic Autonomy 
This is not the first time that Europe has conducted 
abroader political debate about the idea of assuming 
greater responsibility for its own interests and secu-
rity (see text box “Background: Strategic autonomy 
and European integration”, p. 6). The timing of the 
current European debate is attributable above all 
to US President Donald Trump’s rejection of central 
elements of the liberal international order. Other key 
international actors like Russia have also challenged 
central components of the international order. So the 
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problems to which greater strategic autonomy is sup-
posed to supply solutions are not restricted to the 
future of the transatlantic relationship, and are con-
siderably more complex. We can speak of normative, 
territorial and institutional dimensions: International 
norms and principles – such as the prohibitions on 
torture, on the use of force in international relations, 
or on the use of chemical weapons – have been ex-
plicitly or implicitly called into question. Individual 
actors have chosen to use force to change a territorial 
order that had largely held since 1945. And the United 
States, together with other states that otherwise 
present themselves as supporters of the international 
order, has weakened international organisations, 
Background: Strategic autonomy and 
European integration 
  
The concept of strategic autonomy appears frequently in 
recent EU documents like the Global Strategy of 2016, 
generally in connection with strengthening and reforming 
the CSDP in the scope of the CFSP. In the broader under-
standing of strategic autonomy adopted in this study the 
term also touches on fundamental questions of Europe’s 
foreign policy role and influence. The roots of these issues 
extend back to the very beginnings of the European Com-
munities. 
The (Western) European striving for self-assertion and 
self-determination under conditions of structural bipolarity 
was an important driving force in the founding of the Euro-
pean Communities. This is evidenced not least by the plans 
to create a European Defence Community in connection 
with the European Political Community. The immediate 
consequence of the rejection of the European Defence Com-
munity in 1954 was that the EEC states largely “outsourced” 
their security and defence to NATO and thus cemented the 
primacy of the Atlantic Alliance over the EC/EU for many 
decades. 
Nevertheless, under this military umbrella the EC/EU 
was able to develop and combine its own foreign policy and 
security capabilities and resources, with France in particular 
bringing these into play as steps towards greater self-reliance 
vis-à-vis the United States. This applies to the incremental 
expansion of cooperation and integration in three central 
fields: the common trade policy (from the 1960s), the Euro-
pean Political Cooperation/CFSP/CSDP (since the 1970s), and 
the euro as the single currency completing the Economic 
and Monetary Union (since the 1980s). 
The EU’s unsimultaneous and (sectorally) multi-track 
development to become a self-reliant international actor has 
buried the original idea of the European Defence Communi-
ty and the European Political Community: that such a high 
degree of pooling or even transfer of sovereignty demands 
the creation of a political community or union (whether 
federal or inter-governmental). This is the thrust of the 
French autonomisation debate, which speaks of European  
 sovereignty. But Macron’s Sorbonne speech has proven 
unpalatable and hard to translate into German terms, 
because in Germany sovereignty is interpreted above all 
through the legal lens of constitutional theory. 
The strategic autonomisation discussion has received a 
boost from Brexit and the actions of the Trump Administra-
tion. As far as Germany is concerned these developments 
rattle the inherent structure of its policy on Europe and the 
central pillars thereof, the relationships to France and the 
United States. Especially in questions of defence, Germany 
has historically pursued a “best of both worlds” line that 
treated the European context as (only) a complement, but 
not as competition to the transatlantic frame. To this day 
Germany avoids discussing moves towards autonomisation 
in a context of “for or against the United States”. That was 
an important concern in the transatlantic-leaning preamble 
to the Franco-German Élysée Treaty of 1963. 
Different priorities and sometimes also objectives within 
the Franco-German core left the concept of autonomisation 
vague for decades and put a brake on its political dynamism. 
And the accession of the United Kingdom in 1973 and the 
Central and Eastern European states in 2004/07 further re-
inforced the position of “in dubio pro United States” and put 
a damper on ambitions for a “Europe puissance” (1998). The 
explosive nature of the transatlantic question for European 
integration is illustrated by the conflict between old and 
new Europe over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, when 
Berlin unexpectedly joined Paris in refusing to participate 
in Washington’s “coalition of the willing”. But the European 
Security Strategy that emerged at the time (2003), like the 
Global Strategy, held almost unchanged to a balanced multi-
track approach. Both documents adhere to a concept of “the 
West” in which the EU is not forced into a position of pure 
allegiance to the United States, but can play a role of its own 
in international politics as a second Western voice. This role 
concept includes the EU asserting itself as a both independ-
ent and cooperative power factor. 
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international regimes, and international agreements 
by ignoring, exiting, undermining or even seeking to 
break them up. 
The EU and its member states are under pressure 
from within and without: from within because the 
normative, political and institutional structure of the 
EU threatens to collapse under the weight of external 
crises and populist and nationalist movements; from 
without because competing actors with deviating 
normative ideas and interests (United States, Russia, 
China) seek to influence the EU’s inner workings 
and to sow division among the member states. At the 
same time the EU and its member states find it in-
creasingly difficult to play an effective part in shaping 
the global order, when other major powers pick and 
choose among international rules or throw them 
overboard altogether. 
The need and capacity for strategic autonomy vary 
between policy fields and sets of rules. In the area of 
trade policy and the World Trade Organisation, the 
EU’s exclusive responsibility forms the basis for suc-
cessfully asserting its policies and preferences. In digi-
talisation and data protection too, the EU possesses 
both the means and the will to exert international 
influence. But the dispute with Washington over the 
Iran nuclear deal underlines how hard it is for the 
EU to defend its own ideas about international order 
and security against political and economic pressure. 
Europe still has huge steps before it on the road to 
strategic autonomisation, and not only strengthening 
its own defence capacities. But at the same time the 
necessity to travel this road in order to be able to pro-
tect Europe’s own values and interests is very clear. 
A critical analysis will demonstrate that the striv-
ing for strategic autonomy involves contradictions 
and conflicts of goals that politics cannot ignore for 
ever. The rejection of binding international rules – 
which characterises the current policies of the United 
States and other major powers – is after all discussed 
as an attempt to gain or regain (more) control or sov-
ereignty. In their striving for greater strategic autono-
my or sovereignty for Europe, Germany and its Euro-
pean partners need to clearly distance themselves 
from that standpoint, both discursively and practically. 
Otherwise, in the worst case, Europe could actually 
encourage a further erosion or compartmentalisation 
of the international order rather than strengthening 
it. That would fundamentally contradict German and 
European interests. Precisely for that reason it is im-
portant to describe and understand strategic autono-
my not as an end in itself but as a means to guard 
values and interests. That also means upholding and 
developing an international order that is at least 
rules-based, open and inclusive, and if possible also 
liberal. 
What We Are (or Should Be) 
Talking About 
Our analyses and recommendations relate to the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany as an actor. In the follow-
ing chapters we will address significant aspects that 
belong on the agenda if an expansion of European 
strategic autonomy is to be sought. Each of these 
individual aspects (also) affects German politics, and 
demands discussions and decisions in Berlin. Ger-
many is not the EU’s hegemon, but for many member 
states it is a (or the) leading nation. Without a deci-
sive German contribution there can be no European 
strategic autonomy or autonomisation. At the same 
time Germany can only expand its strategic autonomy 
within the European context, in concert with its Euro-
pean partners. And this will have to involve a sym-
metrical or at least more balanced European partner-
ship with the United States. 
Rather than attempting to cover all the regions 
and policy areas of general importance to Germany 
and Europe, we concentrate on those issues and inter-
national relationships that most central to the neces-
sary discussions on the concept of strategic autonomy. 
In our pursuit of a comprehensive understanding of 
the concept, twenty-nine researchers at SWP have 
contributed to this study and furnished their respec-
tive perspectives. Critical questions were discussed 
openly and controversially, and it should be noted 
that not all recommendations are necessarily shared 
by all the authors.  
The first section discusses the EU as – from the 
German perspective – the most important framework 
for the strategic autonomisation of Europe: the EU’s insti-
tutional development and foreign policy and security 
action-readiness, the roles of France and the United 
Kingdom, and the question of the legitimacy of a 
more autonomous or sovereign Europe. The second 
section examines the instruments, capabilities and 
resources that strategic autonomisation demands in 
various fields. Attention is also paid to Europe’s vul-
nerabilities and its conflict-readiness, not least in de-
fending the rules-based international order that is so 
vital for the EU and its members. The issues include 
defence capabilities and deployabilty, the defence in-
Strategic Autonomy: Meaning and Relevance 
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dustrial base, deterrence and the cooperation of Euro-
pean armed forces, as well as economic and monetary 
considerations, diplomacy, sanctions and the resilience 
against sanctions imposed by others, intelligence, and 
civilian conflict management. Finally, we turn to the 
other international actors that shape the increasingly 
multipolar international system – or claim a right 
to define it: the relationships to the United States, 
China, Russia and other middle and emerging powers. 
In the concluding section we summarise our central 
recommendations for German policymakers, with 
reference to Germany’s leading or co-leading role. 
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For Germany, the EU forms by far the most important 
framework for strategic autonomy in the comprehen-
sive sense. This is because the member states and a 
number of other European partners (such as Norway) 
use the EU to assert their economic weight and regu-
latory power internationally, pursuing united, coher-
ent and effective diplomacy and increasingly, where 
necessary, backing this up with military force. The EU 
stands for and advocates close multilateral coopera-
tion and is itself conceived and configured as a co-
operative actor. While ad hoc coalitions may be more 
viable in individual cases, only the EU offers a stable, 
permanent framework for action, which is an indis-
pensable precondition for long-term strategic autono-
my. In matters of security and defence the EU mem-
ber states are highly dependent on NATO, and, in the 
course of developing CFSP and CSDP, on cooperation 
with NATO. With respect to human rights, questions 
of war and peace, and the challenges of global gov-
ernance, the United Nations is the central frame of 
legitimacy and negotiation for the EU. In this con-
nection, the Union should not be reduced to “Brus-
sels”. In reality it always stands for the cooperation 
between member states in the EU system, in other 
words the Union’s organs and their specific decision-
making processes. The strong role played by the mem-
ber states in formulating policy and reaching deci-
sions within the EU is reflected very clearly in the 
European Foreign and Security Policy. France and 
the United Kingdom are Germany’s most important 
European partners and the positions they adopt are 
of particular relevance for Berlin, even and especially 
in matters concerning the development of strategic 
autonomy for Europe. 
Internal Preconditions for Strategic 
Autonomisation: Leadership – Efficiency – 
Capacity to Act 
The question of greater European strategic autonomy 
is inextricably bound up with future constitutional 
developments in EU integration between deepening, 
differentiation and reversal. The current complexity 
of internal circumstances makes it difficult for the 
EU to render any effective contribution on strategic 
autonomisation: the CFSP and CSDP are inter-govern-
mental and consensus-based, and therefore tend to 
be slow, indecisive and susceptible to blockades and 
vetoes of single member states. At the same time 
growing centrifugal forces are reflected in national 
unilateralisms and idiosyncrasies. In practice bringing 
together the Union’s external action under the leader-
ship of the High Representative of the Union for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy is a piecemeal affair. 
That includes the spectrum from external trade policy 
through sanctions, institution-building and humani-
tarian aid to civilian and military missions. The EU 
is often far removed from collective positioning and 
action on the international stage. The larger EU mem-
ber states in particular enjoy access to alternative 
forums. Disparate loyalties and contradictory interests 
also ensure that almost all political conflicts with 
major powers like the United States, China or Russia 
almost inevitably also generate friction within the EU. 
Simply keeping the slow-grinding wheels of consen-
sus in motion consumes enormous political energy 
in Brussels and the national capitals, a price argued 
to be justified in terms of the objective of cohesion. 
Nevertheless the trade-off between inclusivity and 
legitimacy on the one side, efficiency and action on 
the other is increasingly unsatisfactory, as it prevents 
the EU from effectively asserting its interests and 
values. 
In light of the planned departure of the United 
Kingdom – as a foreign policy and security heavy-
The EU as the Framework for 
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weight – and the conceivable future accession of 
small Balkan states with little potential but full 
voting rights, the prospects are not going to improve 
in the short and medium term. Brexit means the end 
of the informal leadership triangle and leaves the 
two – relatively largest – middle powers France and 
Germany at the political heart of a Union of twenty-
seven. Both are adjacent to geopolitically relevant 
spaces of instability in the southern and eastern 
neighbourhoods, and could as such channel the dif-
ferent perceptions and foster a balancing of interests. 
Germany and France will have to drive the develop-
ment of the EU’s internal leadership. In essence, Paris 
and Berlin will have to ensure an integrative equi-
librium within the EU, also in the field of external 
policies, especially the CFSP/CSDP. In this equilibrium 
through integration the power differences between 
the member states will be balanced by the representa-
tion and decision-making rights specific to the EU’s 
institutional system. To date this equilibrium has 
been most relevant in the internal policies and the 
EU’s constitutional advances, and has been based 
on Franco-German compromises. A corresponding 
expansion to the CFSP/CSDP would require Germany 
to make sometimes painful decisions. 
There are two fundamental options 
on the table: an incremental 
approach and a true system 
transformation of the EU. 
There are two fundamental options on the table: 
an incremental approach and a true system transformation 
putting a directorate in charge of foreign and security 
policy. These proposals pose the question of how 
cohesion within the EU would be preserved, and to 
what extent. Both options could be configured for 
compatibility with a – currently rather unlikely – 
shift towards a federal EU. 
Incremental approach (reform option): A shift from 
unanimity to selective (issue-specific) majority voting 
in the CFSP would align with the gradual/incremental 
approach. Qualified majority voting could be intro-
duced for decisions, actions and positions, démarches 
and declarations, and greater use could be made of 
the treaty possibilities of enhanced cooperation and 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The latter 
produces variable geometry – although given the 
(German) preference for inclusivity often only after 
long exploratory discussions and as a last resort. 
Further options include delegating the implementa-
tion of CFSP decisions to particular countries or coun-
try groups, and initiating contact groups and special 
formats that may be integrated ex post into EU struc-
tures or can be linked to these, such as the E-3. Groups 
of countries may also emerge to engage regularly 
around particular issues or regions. 
All these paths and instruments could be used 
more frequently and consistently, and not least be 
developed further in response to crises and challenges. 
The drawbacks are frequently slow ad hoc solutions, 
unclear burden sharing, unpredictability and weak-
ness. The advantages lie in flexibility, in the sense of 
either using the EU framework or operating outside 
it, or employing a combination. One example of the 
latter would be the Franco-German-led talks with 
Russia and Ukraine in the Normandy Format. This 
option would also facilitate the engagement of third 
states like the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, 
Canada and others. 
Enhancing efficiency through majority voting in 
the CFSP is a necessary step from the German perspec-
tive, but is regarded more cautiously in France for the 
risk of losing control and influence. Majority voting 
might be more acceptable for Paris if it were combined 
with other steps such as a structural shift favouring 
the larger EU states. Small and medium-sized states 
fear that a transition to and expansion of majority 
voting would create a dynamic leading to regular and 
formally legitimised “majoritarian rule” by the large 
and influential member states. For many of them the 
attraction of the EU lies precisely in its fundamentally 
non-hegemonic structure. In order to stay well clear 
of the “slippery slope” they are blocking application 
of the passerelle clause (Article 48 (7) TEU), which 
creates an option for majority voting on matters out-
side the military/defence sphere. Enhanced coopera-
tion and other possibilities for exploiting the existing 
treaty options for majority decisions have also been 
little used to date. In fact the EU sees its unity and 
ability to balance the interests of very different states 
very much as a strength, also in the realm of external 
policy. 
System transformation (directorate option): This would 
represent the more radical move, involving a break 
with the equality principle in favour of a permanent 
differentiation of member states’ rights to partici-
pation and decision-making in the CFSP/CSDP. This 
would require the establishment of new structures 
and considerable adaptation of existing ones, and 
would amount to a true system transformation. 
Specifically, a directorate, for example a European 
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Security Council (EU-SC), would be established above 
the European Council as the nerve centre of the CFSP. 
The five largest EU member states – Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain and Poland – and the President 
of the European Council would be permanent mem-
bers of this super-formation, joined by six other EU 
countries on a rotating basis; the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU would always be one of the non-
permanent members. This arrangement could be 
organised broadly on the model of the UN Security 
Council. The permanent members qualify on account 
of their size and geographical location, but would 
also have to be willing to invest in common goods and 
shared capabilities and policies. They would have to 
accept joint decisions as binding and place external 
representation, to a much greater extent than hither-
to, in joint hands. That cannot be taken for granted, 
but would be imperative for internal acceptance of 
the directorate. In this concept the full European 
Council would function as something like a delib-
erative plenary to discuss issues before the twelve-
member EU-SC take decisions, but lose its role as the 
strategic centre and final instance on external policy. 
The entire underpinnings of EU external policy would 
have to be adapted, above all the Political and Secu-
rity Committee, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) and the office of the High Representative. 
The advantages of such a hierarchisation lie in the 
potential for efficiency gains, although these still 
presuppose the usual compromise and package solu-
tions, which would still have to be worked out under 
the new conditions – in and by the entire EU nego-
tiating system. Disputes and rivalries in the EU-SC 
would be expected to be considerably less sharp and 
paralysing than for example in the UN Security 
Council. 
For smaller states with limited foreign policy 
agendas of their own and small diplomatic and inter-
national services, the transformed system would at 
least bring cost savings. They might not automatically 
lose control and influence but that would be their 
fear. Germany could continue to uphold its self-
appointed role as guardian of the interests of the 
smaller countries (which the smaller countries them-
selves regard with mistrust). But this would become 
considerably harder in the context of a firm Franco-
German alliance. Political/strategic convergence pro-
cesses within the EU-SC could nevertheless be accel-
erated and improved in the medium term. If the EU 
became more effective, energetic and united through 
such a transformation, it would be more likely to be 
perceived as a relevant strategic actor by powers like 
the United States or China. 
The flip side of a directorate solution would be the 
loss of the principle of equality among member states 
and the danger of exacerbating frictions among them, 
if countries felt that they were left out and that their 
interests were not adequately represented. It would 
therefore have to be ensured that all member states 
– populations as well as governments – and all EU 
organs regarded the decisions made at the EU-SC level 
as legitimate. This would mean finding formally and 
politically convincing participation and decision-
making processes and communication forms. 
A European Security Council 
detached from the EU would be 
weak and powerless. 
Above and beyond these issues, the directorate 
solution poses the question of vertical linkage with 
the EU’s policy-making system, with decisions and 
policies in areas like trade, competition and monetary 
policy. It is therefore relevant where and how an 
EU-SC might be installed and what its remit would 
be. The state-like agenda for the EU would also bring 
clear theoretical advantages in the Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy, making the Union the most suitable 
framework for pursuing Germany’s foreign policy 
objectives: namely, protecting the EU space in the 
broadest sense, gaining a voice in global politics, and 
shaping the international order. The EU’s entire port-
folio – all its political, economic, military and cul-
tural resources – could and would have to be mobil-
ised. A European Security Council detached from the 
EU would be weak and powerless. Given the centrali-
ty of economic/technological and monetary power in 
international politics, they are also central to any 
internal transformation. But the aspect where Europe 
has furthest to catch up is the military component of 
security policy and its intersection with civilian crisis 
and conflict management. Permanent liaison and 
task-sharing with other actors like NATO, UN, OSCE 
and “G” groups therefore remain indispensable. 
France: Germany’s Most 
Important Partner 
Whether the CFSP/CSDP is gradually expanded or a 
directorate is established, France will be Germany’s 
foremost partner in steering the EU towards strategic 
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autonomy. France itself is likely to want to push 
towards a directorate, because the government of 
President Emmanuel Macron, more than any other 
country, champions efforts to make Europe more 
“sovereign”. Macron’s far-reaching proposals for “re-
founding Europe” name central fields of action, capa-
bilities and resources that the EU must establish and 
develop if it is to become more strategic and autono-
mous in external policy terms. Alongside the Com-
mon Defence and Security Policy this also applies 
to reform of the euro zone, including a functioning 
banking union and transfer mechanism; private and 
public investment in research, new technologies and 
the strengthening of innovation and competitiveness; 
and a leading role in international climate policy. 
If Germany is serious about its desire for strategic 
autonomy it will have to engage meaningfully with 
the French proposals, with the objective of agreeing 
a shared line with Paris and pursuing it consistently. 
Otherwise the project of Europe taking its own fate 
more firmly into its own hands is likely to quickly 
reach a dead end. Germany’s dealings with France 
will become a test of how well three objectives – that 
are weighted differently by Berlin and Paris – can be 
reconciled under the umbrella of strategic autonomy: 
differentiation between EU member states (for exam-
ple in a directorate or core groups), the role of France 
and Germany as the motor of the Union, and the co-
hesion of the EU as a whole. Paris requires Berlin to 
make difficult fundamental decisions, specifically in 
the currently most dynamic area of bilateral coopera-
tion, namely security and defence cooperation. 
The two governments have agreed joint military 
procurement projects and, under the auspices of 
strategic autonomy, criteria for Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) in the scope of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Beyond this, both 
sides are in broad agreement about the future of 
transatlantic relations and multilateralism. Since 
Washington withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, 
Berlin and Paris have grown closer together in central 
foreign policy and security questions. Both emphasise 
that strategic autonomy for the EU in no sense means 
competition with NATO and that no parallel struc-
tures are to be created. Instead, they say, transatlantic 
relations will become more robust in the medium 
term, as the EU states assume greater financial and 
operational responsibility for their own security. 
The defence and security dimension 
of European strategic autonomy 
is discussed in very concrete terms 
in Paris. 
The defence and security dimension of European 
strategic autonomy is discussed in very concrete 
terms in Paris, for example in relation to giving sub-
stance to the “mutual defence clause” of the Treaty of 
Lisbon (Article 42 (7)), which stipulates: “If a Member 
State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, 
the other Member States shall have towards it an obli-
gation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States.” The French government has chosen 
to make Article 42 (7) a priority because it regards 
strategic autonomy as meaning the EU’s ability to 
operate independently. Paris places collective defence 
at the heart of its deliberations and discusses four 
scenarios in which the EU needs to be able to respond 
without assistance from the United States: a terror 
attack against an EU member state, a hybrid attack, 
an attack against an EU member state that is not a 
member of NATO (principally Sweden or Finland), 
or an armed attack on a NATO ally where the United 
States is not willing to respond militarily under 
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. There is also debate in 
Paris about whether France should in future regard 
an attack on an EU or NATO partner as an attack on 
France, to which it could then also respond using 
nuclear weapons. By focussing on collective defence 
Paris is seeking to counter the impression that France 
is interested only in its own narrowly defined stra-
tegic interests. Many EU countries suspected that 
President Macron’s “European intervention initiative” 
would principally benefit France through greater 
European military engagement in Africa. At the same 
time Paris puts Berlin in a difficult situation with its 
focus on collective defence, because Germany has 
to date located that question exclusively in the NATO 
framework. 
Paris is pushing for advances in smaller groups, in 
the EU in general and especially in the Security and 
Defence Policy. Berlin also sees the need for this. But 
as the launch of PESCO demonstrated, it remains the 
case that France presses for exclusivity and optimal 
capacity to act while Germany looks more to inclu-
sivity and legitimacy. France continues to assertively 
court Germany and offers exclusive cooperation, 
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regarding a Franco-German entente as a first step 
towards a possible “Europeanisation” of the Security 
and Defence Policy. At least two projects are involved: 
Firstly Paris would prefer to introduce the most 
important scenarios for independent action in con-
nection with Article 42 (7), principally together with 
Germany. This would also open the opportunity for 
both sides to take the “Élysée Treaty 2.0” (Treaty of 
Aachen 2019) clearly beyond the document of 1963 
(and beyond formulaic affirmations of strategic 
autonomy). Secondly, Paris has long been striving 
to reduce Europe’s dependency on the United States 
in defence procurement, and would like to create a 
more ambitious EU Defence Fund orientated on the 
needs of EU states with internationally competitive 
defence industries. Germany and France, Paris be-
lieves, should operate as pioneers here, and define 
joint arms export guidelines. The French government 
sees little to gain from discussing these questions and 
processes among all twenty-seven EU member states. 
Finally the question also arises of the extent to which 
Berlin would be willing to assume (defence and secu-
rity) responsibility for its EU partners and bear most 
of the associated costs. 
These examples underline how Germany needs to 
review or even revise its integration preferences. That 
is likely to be necessary even under the incremental 
reform option described above, because even this 
would have to supply substantial progress on autono-
misation. France is very critical of the German ten-
dency to place great weight on defining the govern-
ance framework but to neglect the substance and 
purpose (as the United Kingdom always has been too). 
The Status and Special Role of the 
United Kingdom 
In the past the mere fact that the United Kingdom 
was a member of the EU gave grounds to believe that 
the EU could possess strategic qualities in the sphere 
of foreign policy and security. Brexit sees the EU 
relinquishing prestige in this respect and losing a 
potent actor in the CFSP and internal security, above 
all concerning cooperation between intelligence 
services. As a member, it should be remembered, 
the United Kingdom worked to restrict any de facto 
strengthening of the CFSP to pooling of sovereignty 
and capabilities, and rejected deeper legally binding 
integration of the kind that would be required for 
either the reform or directorate option. For either of 
these routes the United Kingdom would be at least a 
difficult partner, if not an obstacle. Anyway, the post-
Brexit United Kingdom intends to pursue a decidedly 
national path predicated on independence and self-
reliance under the motto “Global Britain”. 
Regardless of its “special relation-
ship” with the United States, 
the United Kingdom stands with 
EU-Europe on major foreign 
policy issues. 
The British will naturally continue to play a strate-
gic role (at least in Europe) and will remain an impor-
tant partner for the EU even after they leave. The 
United Kingdom possesses significant strategic and 
foreign policy resources, with its permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council, one of the world’s largest 
diplomatic networks, and close historical relations 
with countries like the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia and India. The United Kingdom is the only 
European member of the exclusive Five Eyes intel-
ligence cooperation, alongside the United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In terms of 
security and defence it also possesses a nuclear deter-
rent of its own, highly combat-ready armed forces 
(compared to other European countries), close mili-
tary integration with individual EU states, and a large 
independent defence industry. As the world’s fifth-
largest economy, accounting for about 16 percent of 
the EU-28’s GDP with the City of London representing 
Europe’s largest financial centre, the United Kingdom 
is also a relevant factor in trade conflicts and eco-
nomic sanctions. Those are areas where the EU needs 
to – and is willing to – prove its ability and deter-
mination. Regardless of its “special relationship” 
with the United States, the United Kingdom stands 
with EU-Europe on major foreign policy issues such 
as Iran, the Paris Climate Agreement and the Middle 
East conflict. The United Kingdom itself wants a very 
close relationship with the EU, including foreign and 
security policy, which would enable a spectrum of 
cooperation from regular consultations to inclusion 
in the EU’s military operations and programmes. The 
current state of play is that the EU-27 are open to an 
ambitious partnership, as long as the existing limits 
for third states also apply to the United Kingdom. 
That means above all no voting rights and limits on 
participation in major projects such as the satellite 
navigation system Galileo, which is important for 
strategic autonomy. 
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The EU has two fundamental options for integrat-
ing the United Kingdom into the European Foreign 
and Security Policy after Brexit. The first prioritises 
strengthening the EU. Here the United Kingdom 
would be included on the basis of the existing rules 
for third states, without a vote or a seat in the EU’s 
organs and committees. The United Kingdom could 
for example participate in the EU Defence Fund 
(making a considerable contribution proportionate to 
its GDP), but would not have any formal say on how 
the money was spent. This “second-class” treatment 
could drive the British towards other forums like 
NATO, the French intervention initiative or other bi- 
and multilateral cooperations (which it might initiate 
itself). But if a European intervention was vital and 
a British contribution relevant, then action could 
be taken by an ad hoc coalition of willing and able 
states, rather than the EU itself. 
The second option prioritises inclusion of the 
United Kingdom in the EU’s Foreign and Security 
Policy, granting it a special role on the basis that it 
falls into a different category than Norway or Turkey. 
Here the EU would grant special rights not otherwise 
open to a third state, such as partial or even general 
participation in EU foreign policy and security organs 
(for example in the case of participation in an EU 
operation), as well as in programmes like Galileo and 
the EU Defence Fund. In return the United Kingdom 
would contribute its resources to the EU Foreign and 
Security Policy on a flexible basis. The gain for Euro-
pean strategic autonomy would have to be weighed 
against the watering down or devaluation of the 
rights and duties of membership and the opening 
up of back-door options for vetoes and de facto par-
ticipation in the decision-making process without 
clearly defined responsibilities and burden-sharing. 
The first option – strengthening the EU system – 
would be easiest to reconcile with the two options 
on the table for the future of the CFSP, reform or 
directorate. The option of a special arrangement for 
the United Kingdom would – like Britain’s EU mem-
bership to date – hamper meaningful institutional 
progress. 
Legitimacy 
Strategic autonomy, in the sense of the ability to 
make and implement foreign policy and security 
decisions, requires strong internal and external 
political legitimacy. 
Internal legitimacy depends on the citizens and 
the governments of the member states recognising 
the EU as a political system worth supporting. 
Because the EU is not a state, it cannot be judged 
by the same standards of democracy and legitimate 
governance. The EU’s general and specific democracy 
deficits have long been discussed in political and 
academic circles. 
Two questions are especially relevant with regard 
to the EU’s strategic autonomy: In which cases and 
under which conditions is it legitimate to transition 
to qualified majority voting in the EU Foreign and 
Security Policy? And in which cases is it advisable 
to involve the European Parliament for reasons of 
legitimacy? 
It should be noted first of all that the use of mili-
tary force – whether in the scope of NATO, the EU, 
the UN or a “coalition of the willing” – remains the 
sole prerogative of the member states according to 
their own national rules. Proposals to expand stra-
tegic autonomy leave this absolutely unchanged, 
at least as long as there is no European army. In its 
ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon the German Federal 
Constitutional Court underlined that only the Ger-
man Bundestag can legitimise the deployment of 
German combat forces or approve German partici-
pation in shared military structures. 
No state can be forced into 
foreign policy positions or actions 
against its will. 
The inter-governmental principle grants every 
member state a veto in the CFSP. No state can be 
forced into foreign policy positions or actions against 
its will. But the member states must actively support 
the CFSP and act in the spirit of loyalty and mutual 
solidarity in order to secure predictability and con-
vergence of positions. Majority voting is, however, 
permissible in other policy areas of importance for 
the development of strategic autonomy. This applies 
above all to the Common Trade Policy, the single 
market and the euro zone. The member-state strand 
of legitimacy relies on the (weighted) votes of the mem-
ber states in the Council, while the supranational 
strand implies the participation of the European Par-
liament. All decisions and legal acts (outside the CFSP) 
are also subject to the oversight of the European 
Court of Justice. If (qualified) majority voting replaces 
unanimity in the CFSP in order to enhance the EU’s 
action-readiness, or decisions are placed in the hands 
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of a European Security Council, the EU will find itself 
confronted with known legitimacy issues: 
To date the principle of unanimity in the CFSP/ 
CSDP has guaranteed formal equality in the Council 
and the European Council between states with dif-
ferent (power-)political weight. Malta, Ireland and 
Cyprus wield exactly the same veto power as Ger-
many, France and Spain. Especially from the perspec-
tive of the smaller and medium-sized states, any 
deviation from unanimity raises the question of how 
their interests are to be guarded and how they can 
assert influence. If no consensus can be reached, 
this means that a minority could not be persuaded, 
despite an earnest search for compromise. So the 
question arises whether CFSP decisions outside of 
military deployment are in fact different in nature 
from, for example, those in the Economic and Mon-
etary Union (EMU). If these decisions are understood 
as being categorically different (with absolutely no 
possibility of majority voting, and thus a permanent 
veto option), there would be lessons to draw for the 
future. Countries with very specific or vital interests 
that are not shared or at least accepted by all existing 
EU states should not be joining the EU; one case in 
point would be Turkey. Membership for such coun-
tries would offer no prospect of convergent foreign 
policy positions and a shared acquis politique. The par-
ticipation of the European Parliament should also be 
considered in connection with the question of intro-
ducing majority voting in the CFSP or strengthening 
the international role of the euro. 
As far as the external dimension is concerned, the 
desire to strengthen strategic autonomy is bound up 
with the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor. 
The Union ties its external action to the principles 
of democracy, human rights and those defined in the 
United Nations Charter. It sets itself the objective of 
preserving its values (Article 2 TEU) and interests, as 
well as guarding its security, independence (!) and 
integrity (Article 21 (2) TEU). Strategic autonomisation 
must therefore also be dedicated to realising these 
goals and values; to that extent it is a means to an 
end. As such, the aforementioned objectives represent 
the yardstick for decisions of both principle and 
detail. Political debates about this at the national and 
EU level need to be conducted much more transpar-
ently and publicly. That is the job of parliaments. 
According to opinion surveys, EU-wide approval for 
greater cooperation between member states on for-
eign policy and security is traditionally especially 
high. But common European policy often involves 
an unequal distribution of political, economic or 
financial costs between individual member states or 
social groups. That is the case where member states 
support one state out of solidarity, where an EU trade 
conflict or sanctions affect only part of the EU’s 
economy, or when military operations touch on the 
interests of only part of the membership. Then the 
actors of the Union – above all the member states – 
need to be willing and able to place these decisions 
in a broader context and communicate this to their 
citizens. That context may be solidarity with EU states 
or others, internal and external political credibility 
in terms of loyalty to European values, or a trade-off 
between different goods. 
The EU’s legitimacy always feeds on both sources: 
indirectly through the member states and directly 
through the interaction of the Community organs. It 
therefore remains fundamental that all decisions are 
rooted in law. But this must also be guaranteed with-
in the states of the Union. In foreign policy and secu-
rity procedural legitimacy and output legitimacy are 
preconditions for acceptance. 
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The question of expanding strategic autonomy and 
playing an effective part in shaping the international 
environment in accordance with European values and 
interests is directly connected with the capabilities 
and power resources that Germany and Europe are 
willing and able to bring into play. Capability gaps 
and vulnerabilities will need to be addressed: the gap 
between the wish for strategic autonomy and the 
reality of available resources is most glaring in the 
context of military capabilities. 
As already noted, strategic autonomy cannot be 
reduced to the military dimension, although the 
latter naturally represents a central aspect. The defi-
cits in the military sphere – with respect for example 
to a more balanced relationship with the United 
States – cannot be compensated by Europe’s diplo-
matic, civil and economic potentials. But conversely 
too, there is little point to expanded military capa-
bilities without those other potentials. 
Germany must therefore devote as much energy 
to discussing defence, deterrence and intervention 
capabilities and the respective technological and in-
dustrial base as it does to effective multilateral action, 
participation in international organisations and the 
strengthening of civilian conflict management capac-
ities. But the strongest power resources Europe places 
on the international scales are its economic and tech-
nological weight and its single market. Greater stra-
tegic autonomy requires not only that these resources 
be preserved, but also that the question be addressed 
of how Europe can become more action- and conflict-
ready not least in the monetary and financial sphere. 
Security and Diplomacy 
Complete strategic autonomy for Europe in the sphere 
of defence and security would only be conceivable 
in the medium to long term, at best in ten to twenty 
years. Alongside adequate financing this would 
require the political support of all member states and 
their potential readiness to renounce national sover-
eignty in order to achieve greater European self-
reliance also in the military sphere. Greater strategic 
autonomy on the other hand demands above all the 
definition of an appropriate level of ambition guided 
by self-defined priorities, and the fulfilment of ensu-
ing self-obligations. In this process it is decisive that 
the EU and NATO interact constructively rather than 
operating against each other. 
Military capabilities can only be assessed against 
the relevant strategic goals. What appears appropriate 
and adequate for one purpose may be unsuitable or 
insufficient for another. In this connection three 
different levels of ambition need to be considered: 
a) (at least initially) ongoing dependency on the 
United States in the realm of collective defence while 
at the same time strengthening the European pillar 
of NATO; b) growing autonomy in a defence grey zone 
that does not necessarily involve the Alliance as a 
whole; and c) limited but necessarily growing autono-
my in crisis management. 
Europe and Collective Defence 
Although the Treaty of Lisbon allows the Union to 
gradually establish a common defence policy, which 
could eventually lead to a collective defence, for the 
foreseeable future NATO will remain central to the 
defence of the Euro-Atlantic space. For the moment, 
Europe will only be able to achieve a credible degree 
of strategic autonomy that includes collective defence 
at current levels within and with NATO, and thus 
only with the United States. In both conventional and 
nuclear terms, Europe is militarily dependent on the 
United States and cannot simply substitute NATO’s 
structures and processes. Whether NATO will in the 
longer run retain the political determination and 
military capabilities required for collective defence – 
and foreign operations – is the first question Europe 
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needs to ask. The second is what Europe can contrib-
ute and what role the CSDP and the EU can play. 
Attention should be drawn to a 
recently revived concept: 
the development or reinforcement 
of a European pillar within NATO. 
In this connection attention should be drawn to 
a concept that originates from the 1990s but has 
recently been revived, namely, the development or 
reinforcement of NATO’s European pillar. It would 
be up to the EU member states to set this in motion, 
although the starting situation is difficult. The Cen-
tral and Eastern European NATO states in particular 
have greater faith in Washington’s bilateral guaran-
tees than in the EU’s solidarity and current and future 
abilities. They fear that a focus on the EU would 
weaken the Alliance and provoke the United States. 
For these reasons some of them are even sceptical 
towards strengthening the European pillar of NATO. 
Germany’s political role here would be to break the 
“NATO or EU” binary. Berlin should emphasise that 
it is in Europe’s own interest to improve capabilities 
and play a more effective role in shaping the Euro-
pean security policy. 
There would be double benefits to such a streng-
thening. Firstly it would improve Europe’s general 
action-readiness, also for engagements beyond the 
NATO frame. Secondly it could increase Washington’s 
interest in Europe as a partner, in the sense that a 
larger European contribution to transatlantic burden-
sharing could stem the decline in US interest in the 
Alliance and in Europe. This would represent a not 
insignificant contribution to a more symmetrical rela-
tionship between EU/Europe and the United States. To 
that extent there would also be a prospect of winning 
the support of other non-EU NATO members with sub-
stantial capabilities (post-Brexit United Kingdom, Nor-
way, Turkey) for strengthening NATO’s European pillar. 
The political role of the United States as the cen-
tral, universally recognised power driving develop-
ments and forcing agreement cannot be substituted, 
but it can be brought into better balance. The Euro-
pean pillar needs to be conceived both in military 
(through larger and more effective military capabil-
ities) and political terms, namely, as a format in which 
European NATO members discuss questions of Euro-
Atlantic security and prepare NATO decisions. 
Instead, since 1999, the EU has created its own in-
dependent political decision-making arrangements 
and rudimentary military structures, with the estab-
lishment of the Common Security and Defence Policy. 
But this European security pillar outside NATO has 
not created a truly autonomous security instrument. 
And in view of the lack of enthusiasm for integration 
in many European countries, this is not to be expected 
any time soon. 
The strength and stability of the European pillar 
within NATO are likely to depend largely on the will-
ingness and ability of France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom to assume joint leadership. As well as de-
fining a joint position, they would also have to win 
the confidence of the other EU states to ensure coher-
ence within the Union. Europe can only come together 
successfully if member states operate on the basis of 
interests, without anti-American provocations. With 
countries like Poland and the Baltic states perceiving 
France’s stance towards NATO as ambivalent at best, 
the European leadership trio would have to demon-
strate the defence and security benefits of strengthen-
ing the European pillar. 
The twin risks on the road to greater European 
strategic autonomy would be fragmentation of secu-
rity relationships within Europe, and unintended 
frictions with the United States. Certain governments 
that tend to be sceptical of the EU might seek to 
strengthen their bilateral relations with the United 
States as a kind of life insurance (see for example 
Poland’s efforts to secure permanent stationing of US 
forces on a bilateral basis) and neglect contributions 
to the EU and NATO. Such a fragmentation would 
weaken Europe’s action-readiness. Already today some 
Central and Eastern European EU member states 
regard strategic autonomy as a project that – in a 
context of capacity deficits – places their own secu-
rity at risk. Unless Germany and France, in the first 
place, can demonstrate at least a perspective for 
closing those gaps then these states are likely not just 
to refrain from supporting the project of expanding 
strategic autonomy in the EU framework but to 
actively block it. 
At the same time Washington does not always 
interpret the discussion about the EU’s wish to oper-
ate (more) independently militarily, politically and 
industrially as a contribution to burden sharing and 
an answer to its repeated demands for Europe to 
assume greater responsibility. President Trump’s 
demands on Europe boil down to: “NATO countries 
must pay MORE” (as summarised in one of his tweets). 
It cannot be excluded that his Administration will use 
the European autonomy debate as an opportunity to 
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turn further away from shared security and reduce US 
military investment in Europe, or to concentrate on 
certain – probably Central and Eastern European – 
countries. This could occur more quickly than Europe 
is able to expand its political, military and industrial 
capabilities. If Europe wants to increase its role in 
these areas it must communicate this absolutely 
clearly to the United States – explicitly not just the 
Trump Administration – and to other partners like 
Turkey. It must be made clear that expanded Euro-
pean capabilities strengthen the Alliance as a whole, 
if and because Europe is actually willing to do more 
for its own security. 
Defence Grey Zones 
While collective defence in the strategic sense will 
remain NATO’s purpose, new security threats have 
in recent years created grey zones where the Alliance 
will not automatically operate. Here the tasks of the 
EU could expand or European coalitions of the will-
ing emerge. This might involve the defence of EU 
member states that are not covered by NATO guaran-
tees, an attack on a European NATO member below 
the threshold for an Alliance response, terrorist at-
tacks within an EU member state, or a hybrid attack. 
In these cases a more autonomous response would 
be conceivable on the basis of Article 42 (7) of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the so-called collective defence clause. 
It has already been applied once, to authorise anti-IS 
operations in response to the Paris terror attacks in 
November 2015. But even if the EU succeeds in estab-
lishing itself as the political framework for such deci-
sions in the medium term, that does not mean that 
operations would be conducted primarily within that 
framework. It is more likely that the trend of recent 
decades would continue: with the exception of 
collective defence, which remains clearly anchored 
within NATO, most operations have been conducted 
by ad hoc coalitions. NATO and the EU support and 
facilitate such coalitions by training interoperability, 
coordinating procurement and providing communi-
cations and IT infrastructure. 
Accordingly, as development of PESCO continues, 
Germany should ensure that the EU’s own crisis pre-
vention and management tasks are not sidelined. 
France especially is demanding that these be granted 
greater weight again. Paris sees an operational dimen-
sion in European strategic autonomy that is also 
based on defence-industrial independence. If Germany 
adheres to a strict interpretation of strategic autono-
my it should also sign up more enthusiastically to this 
vision. Pursuing it would initially be uncomfortable: 
Neither of the components of autonomy – the opera-
tional and the defence-industrial – can currently be 
achieved within the EU framework. But to fail to pur-
sue them consistently for that reason would run the 
risk of denying the EU a security profile of its own. 
The EU as Crisis Management Provider  
NATO’s core purpose is collective defence and deter-
rence, alongside leading combat missions. The EU on 
the other hand concentrates on crisis management in 
Europe’s neighbourhood, where it has achieved far-
reaching autonomy. Strictly speaking, under Article 
28b of the Lisbon Treaty, the security tasks comprise 
“joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, con-
flict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peace-
making and post-conflict stabilisation”. 
In recent years the EU has concentrated above all 
on capacity-building in certain African countries. But 
it has also been taking on “higher-value” tasks from 
this spectrum up to and including combat missions, 
and has in recent years expanded its associated capa-
bilities. So the most pressing need would be to gener-
ate or preserve the political will required for such 
operations. And it would be just as important to fill 
out the framework for cooperation between NATO 
and the EU, which is still very narrowly tied to tech-
nical questions. This is especially relevant where 
activities overlap: hybrid threats, counter-terrorism 
and mobility of troops and materiel. 
The EU member states are currently a long way 
from achieving their self-defined military ambitions. 
By 2010 they wanted to be in a position to conduct 
two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations 
simultaneously in the EU framework, keeping up to 
ten thousand troops deployed for at least two years. 
By the same date they also aimed to be able to simul-
taneously conduct two limited operations involving 
EU Battlegroups, one operation to evacuate European 
citizens, one mission to monitor and close territorial 
waters or airspace, and one civil-military operation 
supplying humanitarian aid lasting up to 90 days. 
As indicated above, the question is going to arise 
whether and how British capacities can in future be 
productively integrated into the European Security 
and Defence Policy. In the scope of NATO, with its 
core tasks of collective defence, crisis management 
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and cooperative security, the European states want to 
put themselves in a position to conduct two large and 
six small operations, or one very large operation with 
up to one hundred thousand soldiers. 
This is not even about a “European army”, which 
is often talked up in big political speeches with little 
regard to the sovereignty-related reservations of all 
states involved. In order to progress towards greater 
strategic autonomy Europe must instead close capa-
bility gaps that have persisted for years, above all 
with regard to strategic transport reconnaissance and 
command capability. Here, as in strategic deterrence, 
there is still great dependency on the United States. 
In relation to Europe’s defence-industrial base 
there is little prospect of being able to claim strategic 
autonomy any time soon. Although the larger EU 
states in particular are capable of developing and 
manufacturing major military systems, Europe’s 
demand management and harmonisation leaves a 
great deal to be desired. The greatest impediment 
here remains the national orientation of defence 
planning and procurement. If the EU member states 
continue to procure more than 80 percent of their 
military equipment nationally, equipment costs will 
remain excessive. This also stands in the way of 
creating the interoperability of capabilities required 
for operations. 
If spending remains constant it will be between ten 
and twenty years before European states can operate 
at today’s technical level with weapons systems pro-
duced in Europe. Larger projects, such as a new fighter 
jet, would require even longer. The situation will be 
further exacerbated if the member states fail to agree 
on shared arms export criteria. Germany and France 
are currently at an impasse. Paris is making the joint 
development and production of a new warplane con-
ditional on the possibility of exports. Because national 
demand is insufficient to fully utilise the capacities of 
defence manufacturers in Europe, they are reliant on 
exports and dependent on demand from third coun-
tries for example in the Middle East and Asia. Unless 
the member states succeed in consolidating their 
industrial capacities at a sensible level and agreeing 
shared export criteria, strategic autonomy in the 
defence industries is unlikely to be achieved. 
Germany and other European states can of course 
purchase American defence products, but this gener-
ates technological and even political dependencies. 
France in particular rightly points out that EU states 
must seek permission from Washington each time 
they use US-made Reaper drones, while all data con-
cerning operation and maintenance of the F-35 fighter 
passes through servers located in the United States. 
This example underlines very well the special nature 
of arms sales: states are not just buying an airplane; 
the purchase of an American jet underlines the sig-
nificance of transatlantic relations and US security 
guarantees. Belgium for example has rejected the 
European project and chosen to acquire the F-35. For 
the same reasons other EU states also intentionally 
seek dependency on the United States. 
Expressed differently, in order to achieve greater 
strategic autonomy, European states would have to 
cooperate considerably more comprehensively on 
military capabilities. The EU can contribute substan-
tially to expanding interoperability and collective 
operational readiness through ongoing efforts to pro-
mote a European arms market, joint development 
and procurement projects, and common standards. 
The Nuclear Question 
In the political and academic discussion it is a matter 
of controversy whether strategic autonomy must also 
include the capacity for nuclear deterrence. Three 
dimensions need to be distinguished. 
The first is the deterrence of existential attack on 
European territory. Here the duty of collective defence 
under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty continues to apply. 
Alongside the United States, the European nuclear 
powers – the United Kingdom and France – will 
continue to contribute nuclear capabilities to NATO 
and thus guarantee deterrence capability in the event 
of any attack on existential European interests. As 
such, deterrence of nuclear attack by another state 
appears to be guaranteed for the future; in such a 
case the attacker would have to expect nuclear retri-
bution. 
The second aspect is the ability to deter “nuclear 
blackmail”. While this has not posed a real threat 
in the past, it remains a conceivable risk for action-
readiness. Here strategic autonomy would mean 
organising European defence efforts to ensure that 
Europe would have no need to yield out of fear of 
nuclear escalation. This would require European 
agreement on shared principles and rules with 
respect to credible deterrence. Such agreement cur-
rently only exists within NATO. France has to date 
shown no willingness to discuss these strategic and 
operational questions in the European framework. 
The third consideration is to preserve European 
action-readiness in the context of regional crises in 
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which other nuclear weapons states are also involved. 
Such interventions can quickly acquire a nuclear 
dimension, and are conceivable in the Middle East, 
as well as in Asia. Such scenarios place maximum 
demands on strategic action-readiness. 
As well as resolving the aforementioned problems 
of coordinating among allies, a deep and robust 
agreement on objectives of intervention and means 
for achieving them also needs to be achieved. To date 
there has rarely been an intervention by European 
states where the level of agreement was so strong that 
the most powerful – nuclear – “card” could have 
been brought into play. The discussion about the role 
of nuclear weapons – as also reflected in the dis-
armament debate – has become so toxic in the EU 
that attempts to find a consensus are no longer even 
sought. In that context the much greater challenge 
of a “common EU deterrent” appears illusory. 
A “Europeanised” nuclear deterrent on the basis of 
the existing French arsenal is fundamentally conceiv-
able. A massive nuclear arsenal would not be required 
to deter a nuclear attack on an EU state. It would suf-
fice if France – and with it the EU – were able to 
credibly threaten a nuclear response to an attack on 
an EU member state. Certain statements by French 
presidents in the 1990s, and most recently by Emma-
nuel Macron, suggest that France might be willing to 
expand its nuclear guarantee in this manner. 
To this day France remains outside NATO’s nuclear 
planning group and other relevant bodies, in order 
to retain unrestricted national control over its force 
de frappe. This underlines how unlikely it is that the 
French nuclear defence policy could be integrated 
into a European Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Another point of uncertainty is that a future 
French president might not feel bound by their pre-
decessor’s promises. Ultimately populist nationalism 
is not an exclusively American phenomenon. 
Talk about a German 
nuclear option is hot air. 
Talk about the possibility of a German nuclear 
option is nothing but hot air. Such an option would 
be associated with enormous costs and risks without 
any recognisable security value. It would require Ger-
many to reverse its discontinuation of nuclear power, 
establish a nuclear fuel cycle, and throw its foreign 
policy principles overboard by withdrawing from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This would further 
weaken the nuclear non-proliferation regime, stoke 
an arms race in Europe and polarise German society 
to a point where its own action-readiness was im-
paired. 
Civilian Capabilities 
Military capabilities are necessary but not in them-
selves sufficient for projecting power, shaping order 
and dispelling threats. Europe still lacks a shared 
strategy that combines military with diplomatic and 
other civilian or non-military instruments (such as 
conflict prevention, mediation, humanitarian aid, 
development cooperation, post-conflict rehabilitation, 
and sanctions) and avoids automatically prioritising 
military over civilian conflict management. But such 
a strategy would be necessary if strategic autonomy 
was to be spelled out comprehensively and not just 
militarily. Not least with an eye to the European 
canon of values – peace, human rights, democracy 
and rule of law – civilian instruments of conflict 
management and more or less robust diplomatic in-
terventions should not be understood as preparatory, 
incidental or follow-up to the “actual” intervention. 
This also excludes a division of labour where Ger-
many concentrates principally on civilian interven-
tion instruments, other partners on the military. That 
is not what operating as a collective actor means. 
Thus, in parallel to strengthening military capabil-
ities and coordination processes, civilian capabilities 
need to be further expanded, above all to set prior-
ities through shared strategic planning and to deal 
with conflicts of goals and interests. The latter stem 
from the different relationships and interests of indi-
vidual member states and from the friction between 
economic and security considerations on the one side 
and the interest in good governance, human rights 
and protection of civilian populations in armed con-
flicts on the other. 
Diplomacy and Intelligence 
Every EU Foreign and Security Policy will stand or fall 
with the ability of its diplomacy to coherently and 
collectively pursue the Union’s goals and to advocate 
consistent external positions. The stronger the orien-
tation on strategic autonomisation, the more success 
will depend on the diplomatic services of the member 
states and the EU operating in a sufficient degree of 
unison. Currently the necessary preconditions are 
absent; success is obstructed by the national interests 
of individual member states, difficulties reconciling 
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diplomatic processes and traditions, and inadequate 
diplomatic coherence within the European External 
Action Service (EEAS). Political instructions, including 
those from the Council itself, are often not followed 
closely enough and the EU’s potential international 
influence remains untapped. European strategic 
autonomy would demand willingness on the part of 
the member states to coordinate foreign policy orien-
tations and their diplomatic implementation in the 
EU framework in such a way as to avoid unilateral 
action on the part of individual – especially larger – 
states. In order to apply this in everyday diplomatic 
activity the EEAS would have to become an independ-
ent foreign service: a coherent apparatus with its own 
career paths, led by a High Representative with the 
political clout to independently conceive and imple-
ment foreign policy within the scope of their respon-
sibility. It would also need the member states’ man-
date and trust to negotiate with third parties in the 
name of the Union. The Brexit process has strikingly 
underlined the extent of the EU’s ability to assert 
its interests through a collective negotiating arrange-
ment. Even if such a double strengthening of the 
Union’s foreign policy action-readiness runs counter 
to current renationalisation trends, Berlin should 
declare it a priority if it is serious about pursuing 
the goal of strategic autonomy. 
Autonomous security action often depends on 
confidential information. Even if the idea of a supra-
national EU secret service is currently politically out-
landish and excluded by the treaties there are impor-
tant starting points for the intelligence support re-
quired for the European Foreign and Security Policy. 
The EU presently possesses two connected analysis 
units in the EEAS and in the EU Military Staff, which 
in the first place prepare joint situation analyses and 
response options on the basis of reports from national 
services. This to date fundamentally voluntary co-
operation could be expanded and supported in four 
areas: Firstly there is a need for reliable coordination 
of thematic and geographical priorities among 
national services in the collective European interest. 
Such a division of labour could – analogously to 
PESCO – initially be agreed between certain member 
states in order to bypass the high hurdles to binding 
EU cooperation. Secondly European-level research 
and procurement programmes for analysis of large 
volumes of data will be needed. Thirdly the EU 
should – above and beyond initiatives for combating 
disinformation – mobilise considerably greater tech-
nical, organisational and human resources for its own 
data security and counter-espionage. Fourthly the 
powers of the national oversight bodies for intelli-
gence services need to be strengthened and their 
cross-border networking intensified, in the interests 
of rule of law, democratic control and legitimacy in 
this highly sensitive area of European security policy. 
Sanctions 
Europe has demonstrated beyond doubt that it can 
use its resources in a targeted way in pursuit of inter-
national political influence. Sanctions represent one 
of the most robust tools of European diplomacy, and 
have been used increasingly frequently over the past 
two decades. Not infrequently this has occurred with-
out the authorisation of the UN Security Council, 
above all in cases affecting a permanent member of 
the Security Council or one of their close allies. Uni-
lateral EU sanctions could be made more effective if it 
were made more difficult to bypass targeted financial 
measures such as the freezing of assets under EU 
jurisdiction. That would require a better flow of infor-
mation between the member states – which are 
responsible for implementation – and the European 
Commission about which banks hold specific, poten-
tially freezable assets belonging to listed individuals, 
institutions and organisations. More resources should 
also be invested in gathering reliable empirical data 
on direct and indirect economic impacts. The avail-
ability of more informative data could help to objec-
tify political debate about the pros and cons of sanc-
tions and strengthen their broader public acceptance, 
especially where measures are inevitably also asso-
ciated with costs for particular economic sectors in 
the sanction-imposing states. Finally, systematic 
attention must be paid to the extent of political 
demands associated with sanctions, defining concrete 
case-specific milestones for (limited) easing in addi-
tion to the top-line objectives. This would also create 
additional incentives for negotiations with the affected 
states and at least reduce the danger of particular 
sanctions becoming permanent rather than acting as 
an autonomous – but ideally internationally co-
ordinated – lever of influence. 
The issue of US sanctions that undermine Europe’s 
economic and political sovereignty points up some 
of the limits of European action. Washington is cur-
rently undermining the credibility of European exter-
nal policy by forcing European businesses to abandon 
their (in overall economic terms marginal) trade with 
Iran. US sanctions of this type could potentially also 
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constrain Europe’s leeway towards other countries 
that Washington wishes to pressurise or punish as 
“rogue states” or strategic rivals. This could then also 
affect the Russian and Chinese markets, which are 
of much greater economic significance for Europe. 
An assertive response could also address secondary 
US sanctions, which exclude from US markets any 
European individuals, institutions and organisations 
that undertake particular transactions with the Ira-
nian or Russian energy or defence sectors. One option 
would be an analogous temporary (partial) exclusion 
of US businesses from the European market. But that 
would also contradict the European interest in an on-
going close comprehensive transatlantic partnership. 
In response to the US sanctions against Iran, the EU 
renewed its Blocking Statute and is working to keep 
financial channels open by creating a special purpose 
vehicle. The EU cannot, however, satisfy the needs 
of international enterprises that require access to 
the US financial markets as long as long arm of the 
American law roams the globe unimpeded and the 
euro plays second fiddle to the dollar as means of 
payment and reserve currency. 
Individual member states could also use their eco-
nomic clout in order to neutralise US primary sanc-
tions that apply US jurisdiction directly to European 
individuals, institutions and organisations. Where 
violations are discovered the civil and criminal con-
sequences are severe. The expansion of US jurisdic-
tion beyond the borders of the United States is one 
of the most important levers by which Washington 
influences commercial risk calculations and forces 
companies to withdraw from particular markets. The 
EU could reject this expansive interpretation of US 
jurisdiction on the basis of customary international 
law and encourage and support affected European 
businesses to challenge the global reach of US sanc-
tions before the US courts. While such cases take 
time, this would send a clear message to both 
Washington and European businesses that inter-
national law must be observed. 
Arms Control 
Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are 
core issues of European Foreign and Security Policy 
in which European diplomacies have accrued a 
wealth of competence. Effective collective control of 
arms potentials and relevant technologies represents 
a necessary supplement to a more autonomous mili-
tary security policy, which can contribute effectively, 
preventively and sustainably to reducing threat 
potentials. The more capable Europe becomes mili-
tarily, the more it should also think about where it 
would be willing to do without expanded capabilities 
in favour of cooperative arrangements. This is the 
case above all with the as yet unregulated “emerging 
technologies” such as cybertechnology and autono-
mous weapons systems. 
Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation 
will without doubt become more difficult as existing 
and emerging powers reject constraints on their 
national capabilities. At the same time many global 
conflicts of interest are reflected within the EU itself, 
including between nuclear weapon states and non–
nuclear weapon states. Whenever Europe has suc-
ceeded in bridging these conflicts internally, the 
resulting compromises have had global impact. If 
they want to operate as an influential global power 
the EU member states should not shy from internal 
debates about issues like the Treaty on the Prohibi-
tion of Nuclear Weapons. 
Independent European instruments to control 
critical technologies, such as export controls, are 
necessary but not sufficient responses to the global 
problem of proliferation. Strategic autonomy there-
fore means above all developing independent Euro-
pean initiatives for effective multilateral approaches 
and finding appropriate partners for pursuing them 
against political resistance. Europe should therefore 
concentrate on fields in which it can make a concrete 
contribution to preserving and expanding bilateral 
and multilateral regimes. In this sense the Iran deal 
represents a test case for the EU’s willingness and 
ability to secure an important advance in non-pro-
liferation. If the Iran deal fails, the chances of a suc-
cessful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review con-
ference in spring 2020 also recede. 
The EU should renew its 2003 Strategy against Pro-
liferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This could 
include a European initiative for a non-proliferation 
fund. Within a policy directed towards greater autono-
my, Europe can also apply its economic power to 
achieve non-proliferation objectives, for example 
pressing for the reintroduction of non-proliferation 
clauses in trade and cooperation agreements. Con-
flicts of goals between arms control interests on the 
one side and economic/geopolitical interests on 
the other will be inevitable in this process. 
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International Organisations 
Strategic autonomy also means making better use of 
Europe’s potential within the UN system and other 
international organisations. As well as forming the 
broadest institutional framework for international 
cooperation, in many countries international organi-
sations also play decisive roles in securing peace, 
restoring state order and implementing political and 
economic reforms. For example a strategic partner-
ship between the EU and the UN involving trilateral 
meetings with the African Union is already promot-
ing cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis manage-
ment. The partnership is facilitated by the fundamen-
tal agreement between UN and EU concerning nor-
mative goals and principles. The international per-
ception of the EU as a strategic actor – and probably 
also its influence on mandate decisions and the con-
crete shape of UN operations – could be enhanced 
if the member states were willing to contribute Euro-
pean rapid response forces (for example EU Battle-
groups) on a case by case basis to support the UN, 
potentially even under UN command. 
A permanent UN Security Council 
seat for the EU will remain an 
unrealistic prospect for the 
foreseeable future. 
With their voting rights and financial contribu-
tions Germany and its European partners already 
influence the shape and work of international orga-
nisations. But they could attain greater weight if 
national voting rights were more strongly bundled or 
Europeanised. A permanent UN Security Council seat 
for the EU will remain an unrealistic prospect for 
the foreseeable future. But normally two EU member 
states hold non-permanent seats at any one time, and 
in 2019 it will be three (Belgium, Germany, Poland). 
Together with France as a permanent member, a 
mechanism should be found to ensure coherent vot-
ing decisions and better communication with the 
other EU states. 
The same applies to international financial institu-
tions. The European Commission’s plans to unify 
the euro countries’ voting rights in the International 
Monetary Fund should be realised as quickly as pos-
sible – and would give the euro zone greater weight 
than the United States. Greater use should be made 
of the programmes of the international financial 
institutions to further European interests. In various 
countries the international financial institutions 
not only influence economic development but also 
indirectly shape other policy fields, above all through 
their financial influence. Germany and its European 
partners should therefore understand the reform 
programmes of the IMF and the long-term develop-
ment perspectives and projects of the World Bank 
and other regional development banks as foreign 
policy tools. This does not necessarily mean direct 
influence on the configuration of programmes them-
selves. Instead the provision of funds could be tied to 
bilateral ancillary agreements seeking improvements 
in governance or human rights. 
As an export power the EU also possesses a special 
interest in preserving the global trade order – in an 
environment where the Trump Administration has 
been actively undermining the World Trade Organisa-
tion and promoting an opportunism among other 
WTO members that could endanger the entire global 
economic order. Europe is certainly conflict-capable 
in this respect, with a huge internal market whose 
influence would persist even if the United States were 
to withdraw from the WTO. While it may have re-
quired a hegemonic power to create the WTO in the 
first place, that is not required for its continuation. 
Together with like-minded economic powers such as 
Australia, Canada, Japan and South Korea, the EU 
can create a coalition to preserve and renew the WTO 
rules. Selective alliances with states like China and 
Russia are also possible where interests coincide. 
Economy, Trade, Competitiveness 
Economic performance is a significant source of for-
eign policy power. So it is not insignificant that the 
EU still accounts for 21.6 percent of global GDP, 15.2 
percent of global trade in goods, more than 20 per-
cent of trade in services and 21.2 percent of foreign 
investment. 
Over time, however, the EU has been falling be-
hind the other two main regions of North America 
(Canada, Mexico, United States) and East Asia (China, 
Japan, South Korea, ASEAN). This applies both to GDP 
(North America 27.8 percent, East Asia 26.5 percent) 
and foreign investment (North America 23.0 percent, 
East Asia 32.3 percent). Even if Europe is bound to 
continue to fall further behind the Asian winners of 
globalisation, it will remain an economic pole on the 
global scale. Europe’s economic value creation, com-
mercial decisions and technological innovations are 
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all of global relevance. On account of its GDP, its 
broad industrial profile and its high foreign trade 
ratio Germany plays in a league of its own in Europe. 
The interdependency of trade and growth mean that 
Germany’s economic stability and growth are essen-
tial both for Europe’s prosperity and for its global 
economic and political influence. 
Germany and Europe’s economic stability, prosper-
ity and competitiveness are subject to external and 
internal risks and vulnerabilities. For all the benefit 
European states and societies derive from intense 
global economic connectedness and interdependency, 
this occasionally creates so-called connectivity risks; 
the European economy depends on reliable external 
sources of energy, raw materials and technological 
components. The risk of macro-economic instability 
was highlighted in 2008/09 by the financial crisis, where 
the credit markets ceased to function for a time, in-
come, employment and growth collapsed, and willing-
ness to share losses within the euro zone dissipated. 
Global competition means continuous defence of 
market positions against non-European competitors, 
creating ever new challenges for entrepreneurial 
initiative and state industrial policy. Germany and 
Europe will hardly be able to defend their competi-
tiveness without capable human capital, sophisticated 
market demand, an innovation-promoting environ-
ment, modern infrastructure and a forward-thinking 
regulatory system. Economic performance and tech-
nological innovation are thus necessary preconditions 
for a European strategic autonomy. 
As a global economic pole the 
Single Market is a veritable 
European power resource. 
As a global economic pole the European Economic 
Area is a veritable European power resource. External 
economic interdependencies are always asymmet-
rical, so Europe’s economic relations with its neigh-
bours always also have a power-political component. 
This applies even where it is unintended, as in the 
case of Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU. 
Conversely the EU’s intense external economic con-
nections make it vulnerable, especially in relation to 
the heavyweights United States and China, which are 
both willing and able to actively exploit economic 
dependencies to assert political interests. 
The United States and China are the EU’s princi-
pal – but not only – partners and competitors (or 
even adversaries) in all global economic contexts. 
Single Market and Trade 
The single market represents the heart of European 
integration and is decisive for the EU’s internal 
cohesion and external economic action. In questions 
of regulation, trade and competition the EU is already 
perceived internationally as a strategic actor, espe-
cially by the United States and China. 
In its extent, the European Single Market is the 
world’s largest, with corresponding influence on 
global prices and trade volumes. With the Single 
Market, as the incarnation of converging rules and 
standards, the EU possesses unparalleled experience 
with trade policy instruments other than tariffs, and 
is setting deep parameters in matters such as produc-
tion processes and working conditions. The EU cur-
rently has trade agreements with more than seventy 
states and is conducting negotiations with another 
twenty-five. The weight of the EU’s large single mar-
ket allows it to develop the rules for trade, investment 
and services in bilateral agreements. Here the EU’s 
unique experience lends it a competence advantage 
acquired through the harmonisation of major regu-
latory differences between member states in the 
course of successive integration and the establish-
ment of the internal market. One current example 
of such rule development is the new European model 
for investor-state dispute settlement, which was first 
introduced in the trade agreement with Canada 
(CETA). The EU’s role as leader and reform motor is 
valued especially by like-minded states, for example 
in relation to proposals to reform the WTO and in up-
holding WTO principles against the other two major 
trading powers, the United States and China. 
The European Commission’s exclusive responsibil-
ity for trade and competition rules, which is necessary 
to ensure the functioning of the single market, also 
affects the preservation of internal coherence: It per-
mits the Commission to defend the Union’s line against 
actions such as state aid for particular branches and 
enterprises that contradict the common trade policy 
and weaken the EU’s unified external front. Reconcil-
ing the different trade interests of EU member states 
will remain tricky, especially where they are exposed 
to external political pressure and influence. 
In competition policy European monopoly and 
merger rules grant the EU an instrument that is also 
highly effective against large and powerful corpora-
tions even outside the EU’s external borders. For 
example in 2015 Gazprom had to accept the Commis-
sion’s competition requirements for its business in 
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central and eastern Europe. And in July 2018 the EU’s 
Commissioner for Competition imposed a record fine 
of €4.3 billion on Alphabet/Google for abusing the 
market dominance of its Android operating system. 
Technology 
Alongside the United States and North-East Asia, 
Europe is the third major producer of technical inno-
vation and knowledge. Europe possesses known 
strengths in fields such as pure research and applied 
industrial technology but also suffers deficits espe-
cially in crucial new fields like quantum computing 
and data-driven applications, as well as generally 
unfavourable conditions for rapid innovation-driven 
growth. So for the foreseeable future Germany and 
Europe will not be in a position to catch up with China 
and the United States in the digital economy. This 
makes the focus on invention and innovation all the 
more important, where technological capabilities form 
the basis for creating global influence and reducing 
dependencies. In information technology and crypto-
graphy, for example, Europe can only influence 
standardisation processes and technology utilisation 
if it possesses the necessary knowledge and relevant 
research and manufacturing capacity. Relevant exam-
ples here include the new 5G cellular network stand-
ard, artificial intelligence, and robotics/autonomous 
systems. In many fields of technology, however, the 
need is not for autonomy but for participation and 
multilateral governance in order to make the most of 
potentials – also in the interest of European foreign 
policy. The field of space technology and access illus-
trates the benefits of a mix of independent capabili-
ties (like the Galileo and Copernicus programmes of 
the European Space Agency and the European Com-
mission respectively, and the launch capacity of the 
Ariane 5/6 rockets) and the ensuing possibilities for 
cooperation such as the International Space Station 
ISS. Europe’s own role in space technologies makes it 
a sought-after cooperation partner for the United 
States, Russia and China. 
Energy 
The EU and all its member states are net importers of 
energy. The EU’s highest import ratios are for oil with 
87.7 and natural gas with 70.4 percent. Altogether 
the EU states enjoy a high degree of security of supply 
thanks to their interconnectivity, their established cri-
sis mechanisms, a well-developed import infrastruc-
ture and the attractiveness of their markets. But mar-
kets are cyclical and the centre of gravity of the global 
trade in energy is shifting towards Asia. Growing global 
geostrategic rivalries are characterised by growing inter-
connectedness between security and economic policy. 
More strategic autonomy therefore also means free-
dom of action in energy policy. This includes a debate 
about transparent mechanisms and EU rules for stra-
tegically important technologies and infrastructures. 
It is obvious that a successful energy transforma-
tion would expand the room for manoeuvre available 
to Germany and the EU, as well as strengthening com-
petitiveness. But the EU’s consensus over an energy 
transformation is brittle, which in turn weakens its 
influence on norm- and standard-setting. 
As the EU’s largest energy supplier Russia is the 
vortex of current controversies within the Union. Ger-
many, as the state where the Nord Stream pipelines 
makes landfall, is criticised by those who prioritise 
foreign policy and security over energy supply con-
cerns. Nord Stream 2 places Berlin in the delicate 
position of having to balance economic viability, 
security of base load supply and consideration for 
Brussels and European partners. The conflicts of 
interest and interpretation are manifest and tough. 
Guarding Germany’s credibility in relation to Euro-
pean unity will require unambiguous diversification 
steps and the preservation of gas transit through 
Ukraine. A lack of unity within the EU may boomer-
ang in the relationship with the United States and 
potentially also with China. Especially in trade dis-
putes with the United States, Germany needs the 
EU’s backing and support. 
Euro/Monetary Union 
The euro has become an indispensable component of 
the single market. The common currency facilitates 
the exchange of goods and services, secures price sta-
bility and drives other areas of integration such as 
banking oversight and regulation of financial services. 
The euro contributed to the single market surviving 
the global financial crisis of 2008/09; unlike in the 
crisis of the 1930s there were no competition-driven 
devaluations, no complete collapse of the international 
financial system and no prolonged depression. The 
crisis showed the European Central Bank (ECB), as one 
of the world’s strongest central banks, to be flexible 
enough to support economic growth in the euro zone 
and secure budgetary and financial stability, despite 
its primary orientation on price stability. 
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But the diversity and divergence of the countries 
that together form one of the world’s most highly 
integrated economic spaces remain a challenge for a 
stable shared currency. The euro zone’s three largest 
economies alone account for 66 percent of the GDP of 
the EU-19. The northern euro economies are among 
the world’s most open and competitive, whereas 
southern Europe struggles with structural problems 
and the aftermath of the euro crisis. The different 
levels of economic development and institutional per-
formance create ongoing economic imbalances and 
social inequalities between European economies. This 
has produced a situation where the political interests 
of the euro countries regarding fiscal policy, mone-
tary policy and further economic integration stand 
almost irreconcilably opposed. 
Since it was established in 1999 the euro has 
become the second most important currency in the 
dollar-dominated financial system, but its interna-
tional role is currently at a historical low. Investors’ 
scepticism towards the integrity of the monetary 
union grew during the financial crisis. The most im-
portant reason for this was uncertainty about the 
enduring financial stability of individual members 
of the euro zone, along with doubts about whether 
the ECB would be capable of defending the euro in-
dependently if faced with another round of financial 
turbulence. To this day the European financial system 
remains heavily dependent on the United States and 
on decisions of the US Federal Reserve (Fed). In fact 
Washington expanded its position as financial 
hegemon during the global financial crisis. The dollar 
liquidity the Fed granted the ECB between 2007 and 
2010 (central bank swap arrangements) can be com-
pared to the military security guarantee in the NATO 
context. Without this support the EU’s financial 
system would have collapsed with fatal consequences 
for businesses, employment and economic growth in 
Europe and the world. 
Political compromises will be required if the EU is 
to complete and crisis-proof the institutional archi-
tecture of the euro zone. This is therefore also where 
the priority should lie for Germany and the EU: Con-
fidence in the irreversibility of the euro would signifi-
cantly support its international role in payments, in-
vestments, as a reserve currency and as the denomi-
nation of state and corporate bonds. If Germany 
wants to strengthen the euro zone and pursue greater 
autonomy for Europe, it will need to make tangible 
concessions in multiple areas, namely, the creation of 
automatic stabilisers for the euro zone (fiscal capacity) 
and the completion of the banking union. The issu-
ance of joint euro bonds would also send a clear mes-
sage that the European Monetary Union is irrevers-
ible. The European Stability Mechanism should also 
operate more independently of national politics. 
A strengthening of the global role 
of the euro is not to be had 
without changes in the German 
economic model. 
A further increase in the share of international 
payments made in euros could make Europe more 
independent of the US financial system and thus 
protect its businesses from extra-territorial US sanc-
tions. It should however be noted that a stronger or 
dominant role for the euro in global payments and 
currency reserves could lead to a sustained increase 
in its value. This in turn could, at least for a time, 
burden the export-driven economies of a number of 
northern members of the euro zone. It also means 
that a strengthening of the global role of the euro is 
not to be had without changes in the German eco-
nomic model, specifically less export dependency of 
the manufacturing sector, stronger development of 
the financial services sector, and promotion of digital 
innovations and a start-up culture. Preserving Ger-
many’s competitiveness also demands public invest-
ment, not least in infrastructure, information and 
communications technology, and education. These 
steps would involve considerable political and finan-
cial costs for Germany. 
So if the EU wishes to establish the euro as a 
reserve currency, it must first create important pre-
conditions: make the euro more stable, issue its own 
secure European bonds, and share liability risks col-
lectively. Historically speaking a stable international 
reserve currency is always associated with strong mili-
tary capabilities, with the political will and ability to 
ultimately defend the interests of the common cur-
rency area with its own armed forces. 
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Europe has to develop and assert its strategic autonomy 
in a multipolar world order. It is therefore relevant 
how Europe shapes its relations with key actors – the 
United States, China and Russia as well as middle and 
emerging powers – and how these actors position 
themselves vis-à-vis a strategically more autonomous 
European Union. 
Relations with these actors range from alliance and 
partnership to rivalry and confrontation; from inte-
gration and cooperation to distancing and counter-
balancing. These power relations are reflected in dif-
ferent degrees of symmetry and dependency between 
the different poles. Seeking strategic autonomy, 
Europe needs to define itself as a pole in a shifting 
multipolar world order that is increasingly deter-
mined by Sino-American rivalry. 
United States 
Even under President Trump the United States re-
mains the preferred and most important partner for 
Europe. Indeed, until Europe undertakes enormous 
efforts of its own, the United States will be indispen-
sable for its defence and security. But at the same 
time Trump’s motto “America First” and his disrup-
tive and erratic foreign policy challenges Europe to 
more clearly define and protect its own interests. But 
the need for more European strategic autonomy 
stems from deeper and more structural factors than 
just a rejection of Trump’s presidency. Even if Donald 
Trump is not reelected as President in 2020, it would 
be short-sighted for Europe to place its faith in a 
return to the old days of transatlantic cooperation 
and to revert to the familiar role of the junior part-
ner. In a speech in Brussels in December 2018, US 
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo underlined that 
Donald Trump’s critical perspective on multilateral 
cooperation in general and the EU in particular was 
in fact shared in large parts of his Administration. 
Only in a more balanced transatlantic partnership 
can Europe assert its interests in the way the United 
States claims the right to do. Europe and Germany 
should therefore prepare for more controversy, more 
open and more heated debates, and also for political 
disputes with the United States. 
The United States under Trump regards the idea of 
European strategic autonomy in the realm of security 
with a mix of scepticism and rejection. Warnings 
about a possible decoupling of Europe from NATO 
have largely died out in Washington. And the prin-
ciple of “America First” might also suggest that the 
United States be open to the idea of greater European 
self-sufficiency in the area of security and defence. 
But the United States – the Pentagon and the rest 
of the Administration certainly more than President 
Trump himself – wants to preserve its access to its 
European bases. Scepticism towards European 
autonomy is particularly strong where Washington 
suspects that European defence initiatives like the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation could serve to 
exclude US defence contractors from the lucrative 
European market. 
The debate over punitive tariffs is just 
the tip of the iceberg. Lurking under 
the waterline is an ominous conflict 
over the future of the WTO. 
In contrast to the security sphere, the economic 
balance of power between the United States and 
Europe is today largely even, in terms of the overall 
picture concerning trade in goods and services, and 
also investment. But the EU’s trade surplus in goods 
with the United States represents a source of tension 
with the Trump Administration. Trump favours im-
port tariffs in specific sectors in order to reverse what 
he sees as an unfair US deficit and to persuade Europe 
to import more US-made goods. But the debate over 
punitive tariffs represents just the tip of the iceberg. 
European Strategic Autonomy 
in a Multipolar World Order 
European Strategic Autonomy in a Multipolar World Order 
SWP Berlin 
European Strategic Autonomy 
March 2019 
28 
Lurking under the waterline is an ominous conflict 
over the future of the World Trade Organisation, 
which Washington is actively undermining and 
whose rules other countries – first and foremost 
China – have been ignoring for years. 
Sanctions represent another bone of contention, 
where the United States is increasingly exploiting 
Europe’s financial dependency to block and under-
mine European foreign policy and commercial inter-
ests by means of secondary sanctions. If the EU in-
tends to establish the euro as a reserve currency, for 
example to protect its businesses against the reach 
of US sanctions, it must first create a number of 
important preconditions. If the EU expands its finan-
cial self-reliance by this route it could make greater 
use of the euro as an instrument for realising its own 
external economic and foreign policy objectives. 
Washington can be expected to respond negatively to 
this. President Trump plainly sees the EU as a growing 
rival. But it is also conceivable that future US Admin-
istrations could find it opportune to strengthen the 
euro as a counterweight to the growing significance 
of the renminbi and China’s expanding global influ-
ence on markets and governments. 
The conflict between the United States and China 
starkly reveals Washington’s interest in maintaining 
its influence on the EU’s economic and security 
policies. The Trump Administration is plainly pur-
suing an objective of economic containment and 
delaying China’s technological transformation. Large 
parts of the US Administration, especially the National 
Trade Council, the National Security Council and the 
Pentagon, are seeking to economically detach the 
United States from China in order to reduce the exist-
ing economic/technological and thus also security 
dependencies. Washington continues to increase its 
pressure on allies including the EU and its member 
states to unequivocally take its side in the associated 
economic and political conflicts. If Washington were 
to demand that Europe also decouple from China this 
would seriously harm the EU’s economic interests 
because China represents a growth market and a 
source of economic innovations and future develop-
ments. Chinese exports to Europe and investments in 
the EU also make a growing contribution to the Euro-
pean economy and the Single Market. 
In a time of uncertainty about the course of US for-
eign policy and transformation in the international 
system it would be sensible for Germany to develop 
a policy of strategic risk hedging with its European 
allies and to expand its own foreign policy options. 
Even if increasing Europe’s strategic autonomy is a 
long-term affair, the maxim of strategic risk hedging 
already points to certain conclusions for dealings with 
the United States today: Depending on the constella-
tion of conflicts and interests, strategic risk hedging 
can result in a policy of economic and diplomatic 
hard balancing. One example would be the use of 
international institutions to rein in US unilateralism. 
A softer form of balancing could imply Europe show-
ing international leadership itself in those policy 
areas where the United States tends to block rather 
than initiate, such as climate policy. Finally, strategic 
risk hedging can also mean bandwagoning with the 
United States in selected areas. This certainly makes 
sense where an American initiative coincides with 
Europe’s own interests or if US policy can be influ-
enced in Europe’s direction. 
Germany and Europe must consider 
the costs of greater autonomy from 
the United States. 
Regardless of the course adopted by Germany and 
Europe, they must quantify and account for the costs 
of greater autonomy from the United States. This 
applies equally to defence policy, financial and eco-
nomic policy, and to relations with China. These costs 
include the risk of division in Europe. A glance at the 
past reminds us that transatlantic spats such as that 
over the Iraq war of 2003 have always also brought 
intra-European divisions in their wake. Above all bal-
ancing towards the United States – even if it remains 
restricted to specific cases such as the Iran deal – 
makes it absolutely necessary for Europe to agree in 
advance on unshakeable shared positions. 
China 
Against the background of the emerging rivalry be-
tween Washington and Beijing, the balance of power 
between China and the EU and its member states is 
developing increasingly asymmetrically to Europe’s 
disadvantage. Only in trade policy – and partially 
in investment – can the EU hold its own in a form 
respected by China. 
Europe is of eminent importance for China in 
many respects: economically as most important sup-
plier and second most important export market; tech-
nologically as supplier of high-technology; institu-
tionally as a role model; politically in order to pursue 
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its own ends towards third states and above all the 
United States; and selectively as a partner, for exam-
ple in global health and in the stabilisation of third 
regions. While China, unlike Russia and the United 
States, sees a fundamental interest of its own in the 
continued existence and coherence of the EU in a 
multipolar world, in practice it pursues a policy of 
“divide and rule”. China selectively rewards and 
punishes individual EU states depending on their 
political and economic importance and in response 
to the acquiescence expected by China in central 
questions. These include for example arms exports to 
Taiwan, meetings with the Tibetan Dalai Lama, and 
stances on the Uigurs, on the human rights situation 
in China and on the South China Sea. In the process 
China interacts with Europe on all levels, political, 
economic, technological, cultural and academic. For 
this it employs and initiates diverse political channels 
(such as strategic partnerships with the EU and with 
individual EU member states), dialogue formats (such 
as the 16+1 format with sixteen central and eastern 
European states), and high-level bilateral inter-gov-
ernmental consultations with Germany, France and 
the United Kingdom. 
China’s expectations that the EU would become 
an independent full-spectrum actor in global politics 
and act as a counterweight to the United States have 
faded. But China would welcome any EU or European 
push towards strategic autonomy – as long as it was 
not manifested (or even concentrated) in a confronta-
tive stance towards China itself. 
Europe possesses no viable collective 
foreign policy position concerning 
the geopolitical struggle between the 
United States and China over 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. 
While Europe is in principle aware of China’s great 
political and strategic importance, in bilateral con-
texts the EU member states treat China above all as 
a source of economic growth and diversification, as 
export market and investor. Europe’s political inter-
ests – peace and stability in East Asia; Chinese con-
tributions to global stability, development, environ-
ment, climate, and counter-proliferation; improving 
the human rights situation in China – are by con-
trast often treated as secondary and in fact not pur-
sued by all EU member states. Europe possesses no 
robust collective foreign policy position concerning 
the geopolitical struggle between the United States 
and China over hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. 
A clear stance on China’s authoritarian conception 
of order is also lacking. Even in trade and investment 
conflicts Europe fails to find a collective line. Too 
heterogeneous are the size, profiles and interests of 
the EU member states in their relationships with 
China: As far as economic relations are concerned 
there is a gulf between states that are attractive indus-
trial and technological partners for China and those 
that compete as supplicants in Beijing. Some coun-
tries have an explicit interest in global governance. 
The United Kingdom and France also each maintain 
a military presence of their own in Asia. 
European strategic action towards China would 
require a political consensus about European strategic 
interests there. That would demand a stronger priori-
tisation of Europe’s China policy above and beyond 
the current foreign policy issues. The initiative would 
have to originate jointly from Paris, Berlin and 
London. The most important aspect is to demonstrate 
Europe’s economic ability to respond to and match 
China’s state-led economy. Europe’s external eco-
nomic support instruments should also be expanded 
to enable Europe to offer competitive infrastructure 
investments in third states, also in order to compete 
with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
Russia 
Transatlantic policy coordination on Russia has largely 
collapsed since Donald Trump assumed the US presi-
dency. Between the openness for a comprehensive 
“deal” with Russian President Vladimir Putin pursued 
by the White House and the efforts by Congress to 
close down Trump’s foreign policy options with Rus-
sia, coordination with European allies has been side-
lined. This development is overshadowed by Wash-
ington’s increasing use of extraterritorial sanctions, 
which predates Trump’s presidency. 
Greater strategic autonomy for Europe in the rela-
tionship with Russia is especially important in this 
context. At the same time this relationship is espe-
cially affected by significant conflicts of interests. 
Russia remains a multi-dimensional challenge that 
the EU and the European states will not for the fore-
seeable future be able to deal with alone. If the US 
security guarantee were to be weakened before 
Europe is able to strengthen its own capabilities, the 
EU would face new vulnerabilities that Russia could 
probe along the EU’s external borders – for example 
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in the Baltic states – and elsewhere. Today the EU 
and its member states have no adequate possibilities 
of their own to dissuade Russia from asserting its 
interests in an aggressive and risky manner in the 
shared neighbourhood. 
Although European and Russian positions coincide 
on individual issues, such as the Iran deal and US sec-
ondary sanctions, there is no broader strategic over-
lap. So Russia is not a general partner for a Europe 
seeking more strategic autonomy. The EU can thus 
best increase its influence in relations with Russia 
through a rebalancing of transatlantic coordination, 
rather than a decoupling from the United States. 
Moscow is ambivalent towards 
the EU’s striving for greater 
strategic autonomy. 
Moscow is ambivalent towards the EU’s striving for 
greater strategic autonomy. On the one hand it wel-
comes the fractures in the transatlantic alliance that 
have appeared under President Trump as the begin-
ning of the postulated “post-Western” world order. 
Moscow sees this as an opportunity to realise its own 
model of order, a multipolar “concert of major powers” 
in which Russia, China, the United States and the 
more powerful European states regulate their global 
conflicts of interests without heed to smaller states. 
Such a world order offers little space for an actor 
oriented on multilateral rules like the EU. 
Russia sees its relationship with Washington as 
characterised by structural antagonism and is only 
interested in European autonomy in the sense of 
separation from the United States and NATO. On the 
other hand Moscow has no interest in greater Euro-
pean capabilities – and therefore interprets the cur-
rent erosion of the transatlantic partnership (in com-
bination with Brexit and the rise of EU-sceptic parties) 
more as a symptom of progressive fragmentation of 
the West than the beginning of a new European self-
sufficiency. The Kremlin is therefore interested in 
accelerating that process and levering countries and 
political forces where it sees potential for cooperation 
further out of the EU context. So Russia could make 
new offers to an autonomy-seeking “core Europe” in 
the realm of security (in connection with a “European 
security order”) and in part also in the economic 
sphere (following Putin’s offer of a “harmonious eco-
nomic community stretching from Lisbon to Vladi-
vostok”) in order to reduce the weight of US “hard 
power” in Europe. Possible proposals could include 
Russian support for CSDP missions outside Europe, 
for example in Mali, and cooperation in stabilising 
Libya or in conflict management in Syria. 
But when it comes to increasing capabilities capac-
ities at the EU level, resistance from Moscow is a more 
realistic prospect than serious offers of cooperation. 
Especially vis-à-vis the states of the Eastern Partner-
ship, Moscow sees the EU as an adversary challenging 
its right to hegemony in its sphere of influence. The 
most important precondition for greater European 
autonomy is therefore a stronger immunisation of EU 
states against Russian influence in the dimensions of 
media, political parties, minorities, and intelligence 
services. This could contribute to addressing the reser-
vations over the objective of more strategic autonomy 
that are found among central and eastern European 
states, in particular Poland. A strategically autono-
mous Europe will also have to find and hold to a united 
position on economic and energy policy in order to 
reduce the openings for divisive initiatives from Mos-
cow. The controversial Nord Stream 2 Baltic pipeline 
is perhaps the prime example. 
Trade and investment between Russia and Europe 
should as far as possible be shielded more strongly 
from the current unpredictability of US sanctions. 
Part of the solution here is to partially remove the 
exchange of goods and capital between Europe and 
Russia from the dominance of the US dollar. Russia 
and other states targeted by sanctions such as Iran 
and Venezuela are highly motivated to establish pay-
ment systems and commodity markets operating 
independently of the dollar. Given Europe’s much 
closer integration with the US economy this can only 
be a selective matter, for example for financing in-
vestments in Russia, and comes at the price of elevated 
transaction costs. There would also be a risk of wors-
ening relations with Washington. EU initiatives such 
as a special Russia (and Iran) bank or application of 
the Blocking Statute should always be transparent 
and comprehensible for the American side, on the 
basis of “agreeing to disagree”. 
With its close economic ties with Russia and its 
great weight within Europe, Germany remains Mos-
cow’s most important counterpart within the EU. This 
places special responsibility on Berlin for safely navi-
gating these conflicts of interests in every step that 
Europe takes towards strategic autonomy. On the one 
side the dialogue with Russia needs to be maintained 
and meaningful cooperation continued. On the other, 
the coherence of the EU – including its eastern mem-
ber states – represents the bedrock of foreign policy 
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capacity to act. It is therefore important to always 
include the eastern neighbours in the dialogue with 
Russia. Germany’s close relations with Russia in par-
ticular place it in a position to make the largest con-
tribution to developing a strategically more autono-
mous Europe. 
Middle and Emerging Powers 
Germany shares the desire for greater strategic autono-
my with a string of other middle and emerging pow-
ers in the international system. They also find them-
selves challenged to define their place in a changing 
international order and want to make their weight 
and interests felt. But unlike Germany they are not 
part of an organisation of states comparable to the EU, 
through which they could pursue the objective of 
strategic autonomy. Middle powers by definition by 
themselves lack the necessary economic and military 
resources to shape international politics entirely in-
dependently in their own interests. But they do pos-
sess sufficient power resources to actively shape re-
gional foreign and security policy. Most of them also 
share a preference for multilateral cooperation in in-
ternational institutions, civilian conflict management 
and a rules-based international order, to contain heg-
emonic powers like the United States and China. 
So states like Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico and South Korea basically 
have three options for expanding their strategic 
autonomy. Firstly they can define agendas and (fur-
ther) develop norms on the international stage, for 
example through the G-20 forum. As well as asserting 
their own interests they may also act as intermedi-
aries between the diverging interests of industrialised 
and developing countries, as seen in the example of 
climate policy. Secondly they can boost their influ-
ence by forming their own networks and coalitions. 
Thirdly they can more closely coordinate their foreign 
policies in particular areas in order to jointly demon-
strate international influence independently of the 
major powers. 
There are (still) tight limits to closer 
cooperation between middle powers. 
But there are (still) tight limits to closer coopera-
tion between middle powers. The first of these is their 
relationships to Washington. Some of these middle 
powers are closely tied to the United States in terms 
of security and economic affairs. That is likely to make 
the emergence of independent positions and policies 
a costly matter, above all where this involves de facto 
departing from the US line. The states generally clas-
sified as middle powers are extremely heterogeneous. 
Aside from a general preference for multilateralism 
and a rules-based order, the normative orientations 
and interests of states like Turkey or Indonesia differ 
very sharply from those of countries like Germany or 
Canada. Clear differences can also be identified in 
relation to the observance of international law. Widely 
differing views about which parts of the liberal inter-
national order are in need of reform and which should 
be preserved, for example in the UN or the WTO, exist 
among the middle powers. 
In view of this heterogeneity of middle and emerg-
ing powers it is unsurprising to find fundamental dif-
ferences in their positions towards and relations with 
the European Union. Alongside the United States, 
China and Russia, the EU has declared seven middle 
and emerging powers as strategic partners: Brazil, 
Canada, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and South 
Korea. But to date the EU has largely failed to do jus-
tice to the objective of “strategic” partnership in these 
relationships, having neither concretised the concept 
nor fulfilled its partners’ expectations. An EU with 
the goal of greater strategic autonomy would there-
fore have to be able to fill out these relationships and 
reach viable agreements. 
It certainly makes sense to look to an alliance – or 
perhaps more precisely a network – of multilaterally 
minded actors that share Germany’s and the EU’s 
vital interest in a rule-based international order. But 
it must not be forgotten that although some of the 
partners of choice such as India or South Africa share 
the same line on many questions, they cannot simply 
be coopted for the preservation of the international 
order because they themselves call for reform of that 
order. This applies not least to seats and voting rights 
in the UN Security Council. Many of these partners 
would work with Europe for effective global climate 
policy, strong international organisations, the obser-
vance of global agreements and sustainability goals, 
and against protectionist restrictions on free trade. 
But the same partners are a great deal more sceptical 
when it comes to other elements of the “liberal” order 
like the International Criminal Court. A coalition for 
multilateralism must therefore see itself fundamen-
tally as a reform alliance that seeks multilateral 
arrangements but also strives for consensus over the 
possibilities for reforming and developing them. 
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In the light of everything we have laid out in the 
preceding sections, realising strategic autonomy in 
any comprehensive sense is a politically and prac-
tically challenging endeavour. It is also by no means 
certain that key countries like France and Germany, 
or Poland, Italy and Spain, will sign up to this goal 
and pursue it consistently. And with Brexit the United 
Kingdom has sidelined itself. Within Europe there are 
very different ideas about what strategic autonomy 
could and should mean. Especially for this reason it 
is important that Germany develops a reflected stance 
in which it can clearly formulate and pursue the goal 
and purpose of European strategic autonomy. On 
the basis of our analysis six principles can be recom-
mended: 
Firstly: A shift towards greater European strategic autonomy 
is necessary, in order to participate in shaping the inter-
national environment on the basis of European values 
and interests, rather than accepting a role as the 
recipient of strategic decisions made by others. It is 
thus a precondition for playing an effective role in 
shaping the political order, both in the immediate 
neighbourhood and at the global level. 
An instinctive anti-Trump reflex 
alone cannot justify the efforts 
needed to strengthen Europe’s 
strategic autonomy. 
An instinctive anti-Trump reflex alone cannot justify 
the efforts needed to strengthen Europe’s strategic 
autonomy. At the latest since the end of the Cold War 
all US Administrations have demanded more or less 
clearly that Europe should do more to ensure its own 
security and ensure stability in its own geostrategic 
environment. 
This applies all the more as the geographical prior-
ities of US security policy are likely to shift increas-
ingly away from Europe and its broader geographical 
neighbourhood, i.e. from the Mediterranean, Africa 
and possibly also the Middle East. Here Europe should 
and must be in a position not only to set its own 
political and economic priorities but to address crises 
and stabilisation tasks on its own with a comprehen-
sive approach that brings together the necessary and 
appropriate political, economic and military instru-
ments. 
So the force driving strategic autonomy should not 
be any kind of European or neo-German nationalism. 
Nor can and should strategic autonomy for Europe 
be tied to ambitions of pursuing international politics 
alone or cutting ties with the United States. Instead 
the liberal values concerning internal democracy and 
external relations laid out in the German Basic Law 
and the EU Treaty remain the yardstick for Germany 
and its European partners in their striving for greater 
strategic autonomy. In discourse – and in practice – 
Europe should perceptibly distinguish itself from 
those forces that ignore shared rules and systematically 
belittle or undermine multilateral cooperation. 
Secondly: A shift towards greater strategic autonomy is a 
matter of urgency, because Europe is already having 
to assert itself in a new multipolar international con-
stellation today. US President Trump and his policies 
are more symptom than cause of this new global po-
litical constellation, which is witnessing a reordering 
of power centres and power relations between the 
United States, China, Russia and Europe. Europe can 
no longer rely blindly on the US security guarantee 
and normative alignment with the United States. 
The role played by Europe in the new constellation 
in the international system and its success in shaping 
the international order will depend largely on its 
own strength. Washington, Beijing and Moscow are 
ambivalent or negative towards a strategically more 
autonomous Europe. All three take the EU seriously 
as a trade and regulatory power, but they also see its 
weaknesses with respect to action- and conflict-readi-
ness, not only but especially in the military sphere. 
They exploit diverging interests among European 
states, as well as their export dependency and security 
vulnerability. 
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Other major powers will not 
wait until Europe has its 
internal act together. 
Other major powers will not wait until Europe has 
its internal act together. They see themselves more 
or less explicitly as strategic rivals and will attempt 
to coopt for their own ends, sowing division among 
member states and forcing the EU to accept their own 
rules. Overcoming European weaknesses and closing 
capability gaps means moving as quickly as possible 
towards greater strategic autonomy. 
Of all the major powers the United States is still 
politically closest to Europe, and in the sphere of 
security the indispensable partner. But a shadow of 
uncertainty and unpredictability has fallen over the 
transatlantic relationship and the points of conflict 
are stacking up. However strongly Europe is interested 
in preserving and developing the principles and unity 
of the political West, it must pursue a policy towards 
America that actively seeks a stronger symmetry in 
the relationship and successively expands Europe’s 
own foreign policy options. The maxim of strategic 
risk hedging would suggest a differentiated approach: 
Wherever possible on the basis of shared values and 
coinciding or compatible interests, close coordination 
or unity with the United States is the preferred 
option. Ideally Europe would seek durable compro-
mises with the United States and other partners to 
preserve or restore peace and international security 
and find sustainable answers to global challenges. But 
depending on the constellation of conflicts and inter-
ests, the EU and its member states will have to pursue 
“soft” or “hard” economic and diplomatic balancing, 
where possible backed by international institutions 
such as the WTO. When the United States withdraws 
its support for functioning multilateral regimes – or 
works to undermine them as in the case of climate 
policy – Europe will have to oppose this and to show 
leadership in concert with like-minded partners. 
In dealings with China Europe’s strongest trump 
is its trade and economic power and potentially its 
strength as a currency bloc. Against China’s state-led 
economy Europe would need to prove its economic 
prowess in strategically important points. That would 
require for example EU member states to pursue a 
unified line on a controlled opening to Chinese direct 
investment. European companies need to be put in 
a position to compete with Chinese strategic invest-
ments and Sino-centric geoeconomic projects like the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by merging European 
competitive strengths and with the help of European 
foreign trade promotion. This applies above all within 
the EU and in other European states, in the European 
neighbourhood, and in Africa. But the EU should not 
view China exclusively through the economic lens, as 
China pursues global governance interests of its own 
(see BRI) that Europe will have to address. Europe 
needs a comprehensive and collective foreign policy 
strategy to equip itself against the danger of becom-
ing a pawn in the emerging Sino-American rivalry. 
Greater strategic autonomy for Europe is especially 
important in the relationship with Russia, most of all 
in the event of increasing doubts over the US security 
guarantee for NATO territory. Moscow would then 
regard Europe as even more vulnerable and could test 
the Alliance’s determination for example in the Baltic 
states. Where Russia operates aggressively and antago-
nistically in the immediate neighbourhood Europe 
should be capable of contributing more to Western 
hard balancing. This includes strengthening Europe’s 
own military capabilities, but also boosting internal 
political resilience against division within member 
states and their societies. 
When it comes to shaping the inter-
national order according to liberal 
principles, neither China nor Russia 
are partners of choice for Europe. 
When it comes to shaping the international order 
according to liberal principles, neither China nor 
Russia are partners of choice for Europe. This does 
not exclude targeted cooperation in international 
organisations and in resolving specific international 
conflicts, and in fact demands it in many cases. Close 
economic cooperation with Russia and China remains 
beneficial, even if their political and geopolitical 
goals conflict with Europe’s. As historical experience 
shows, interdependency represents a factor for 
Europe’s prosperity and influence and tends to serve 
the preservation of international stability and peace-
ful international relations. Neither economic power 
nor interdependency automatically engender influ-
ence, conflict-readiness and resilience, however. 
Instead they demand a shared strategic orientation. 
One test of Europe’s autonomy and conflict-readiness 
will be whether the EU states can agree on a joint 
approach for dealing with Chinese strategic invest-
ments such as the participation of Chinese firms in 
building the European 5G network and other critical 
infrastructure. 
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At the same time Europe depends more than ever 
on finding partners among the middle and emerging 
powers with which it can jointly work for a rules-based 
multilateral order. Europe’s permanent engagement 
and collective or at least coordinated positioning and 
voting in the UN and its agencies, the international 
financial institutions and the G20/G7 are therefore 
exceptionally important. The EU’s role as motor of 
reform and leadership is especially valued by like-
minded states, for example in connection with pro-
posals to reform the WTO and in upholding WTO 
principles against the United States and China. 
Thirdly: A development towards greater strategic autonomy 
is possible because the EU already exists and represents 
the most suitable framework for Europe to pursue 
such a path. On the one hand that applies in a nor-
mative political and institutional/operational sense, 
where the EU is based on liberal values and works to 
apply them internationally. The legitimacy of the EU 
system is currently under attack above all by govern-
ments and nationalist or “sovereigntist” political 
forces in the member states violating the principles 
of democracy and rule of law. This is an obstacle on 
the road to greater strategic autonomy, because the EU 
states require greater political trust among them-
selves and need to accept the rules of democracy and 
rule of law in order to enhance their strength and 
efficiency. In terms of substance, the actors of the 
EU are seeking a new balance between opening and 
deregulation on the one side, protection and regu-
lation on the other. But only the EU offers the per-
manent institutional framework that is needed as 
the basis for strategic autonomy beyond always unstable 
ad hoc coalitions. 
On the other hand, the EU brings together the dif-
ferent policy areas that are imperative for a compre-
hensive strategic autonomy. As a pole of the global 
economy, the European Economic Area with the 
Single Market as the heart of EU integration is a veri-
table power resource for Europe. For the member 
states the EU represents the framework for defending 
and preserving Europe’s competitiveness against the 
rising Asian economies. Important factors for this are 
capable human capital, sophisticated market demand, 
an innovative environment, a modern infrastructure 
and the ability to enforce rules on the basis of the 
single market, not just within the EU but also 
globally. 
With the distinctions between internal policy and 
external relations fading, the EU is also a suitable 
framework because it is the only organisation of states 
far and wide that possesses a profile almost corre-
sponding to that of a state (although with the impor-
tant exceptions of not being able to authorise military 
action or raise taxes). Despite the CSDP, the EU’s 
weakest instruments with the greatest deficits are 
found in its classical security and defence policy. 
Decisions about deploying combat forces will remain 
a matter for the member states in the long term and 
NATO will continue to play an outstanding role in 
collective defence. But even if that remains the case 
the EU finds itself in a good starting position in the 
race for comprehensive strategic autonomy. In an in-
ternational system tending towards multipolarity it 
already forms a highly attractive pole, in many senses 
often superior to others. 
In all relevant fields with the 
exception of security the realisation 
of strategic autonomy will depend on 
decisions to deepen integration. 
In all relevant fields with the exception of security 
the realisation of strategic autonomy will depend on 
decisions to deepen integration, namely, in the sense 
of transferring sovereignty, increasing cooperation 
within leading groups and not least majority voting. 
By consciously setting a course the EU could signifi-
cantly improve European foreign policy, also by way 
of incremental reform. A series of opportunities exist 
below the threshold of treaty amendments. For exam-
ple majority voting could be introduced in the EU’s 
external policy. It would also be conceivable for the 
EU states – if possible together with the United King-
dom – to operate as a bloc in the UN Security Coun-
cil and as such to make a European position visible. 
Another option would be for the heads of state and 
government to regularly discuss foreign and security 
policy in the European Council independently of 
crises, and give the next High Representative more 
leeway and higher status. Instruments for military 
cooperation like PESCO and the EU Defence Fund 
could be used at a significantly higher level of am-
bition. If these reforms synergise they could be 
expected to lead to the formation and potentially 
consolidation of groups of states that share a greater 
willingness and ability to take action on foreign and 
security policy. Another consequence would be differ-
entiation among the member states, whether on the 
basis of qualified majority voting increasing the weight 
of the larger member states or because the larger 
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states have permanent seats in a putative EU Security 
Council. 
But efficiency-increasing options like majority 
voting will not be enough. The crucial points are that 
the interests and preferences of the EU member states 
need to converge more strongly over decisive issues, 
that actual activity can be orientated on long-term 
plans, and that the speed and scope of planning and 
activity capabilities need to be significantly increased. 
The member states have created formats and struc-
tures at EU level within which all that could occur – 
but make only half-hearted use of them. To that 
extent one can regard tentative proposals to establish 
a directorate above the European Council or to create 
an EU Security Council either as a master stroke or a 
wedge of discord. An EU Security Council could com-
prise permanent and rotating member states includ-
ing the President of the European Council and the EU 
Council Presidency. Whether or not the EU creates its 
own Security Council the member states will have to 
find ways to improve the vertical linkage of the CFSP 
with the EU’s policy-making system for example in 
trade, competition and monetary policy, and thus to 
exploit its potential – as is already tending to occur 
in sanctions policy. 
Fourthly: A development towards greater strategic autonomy 
is challenging, because especially on the European level 
it is necessary to deal with many conflicts of goals. 
The Achilles heel of strategic 
autonomy is currently the Security 
and Defence Policy. 
The Achilles heel of strategic autonomy is currently 
the Security and Defence Policy. In a process further 
amplified by the eastern enlargement of both organi-
sations, Europe prioritises NATO over the EU in this 
sector; this applies almost unrestrictedly to collective 
defence. Although after Brexit the EU and NATO will 
still have twenty-one member states in common, but 
more than 80 percent of NATO defence spending will 
occur outside the EU. While the debate about stra-
tegic autonomy should not be reduced to the military 
components and still less purely to defence spending, 
at the same time it is also true that without improve-
ments to military capabilities and the interoperability 
of European armed forces it will be impossible to 
achieve a substantial increase in strategic autonomy. 
On top of this, central and eastern European states are 
mistrustful that the striving for strategic autonomy 
could pose a threat to Washington’s engagement in 
Europe. The more the EU’s security policy is drawn 
into the integration drive (see PESCO and the new 
Defence Fund), the greater the need for coordination 
with NATO on decisions concerning planning targets, 
standards and processes. Including a post-Brexit 
United Kingdom in the Security and Defence Policy 
without endangering the unity of the EU will be a 
special challenge in its own right. 
This also means that Europe is seeking greater but 
limited autonomy through the Security and Defence 
Policy. A nuclear option for Europe is excluded. The 
EU’s priorities lie in acquiring the capabilities re-
quired to undertake challenging crisis management 
and conflict-resolution tasks independently (without 
the United States). But in the medium term the EU 
will also need to expand its ability to defend the terri-
tory and integrity of its member states. The same 
applies to states that are not NATO members and to 
cases of hybrid or terrorist attack that do not trigger 
immediate action by the Alliance as a whole. Meas-
ured against its own standards, however, the EU 
would need to coordinate its military capabilities 
much better with the civilian, speed up decision-
making, and implement measures coherently. There 
are also grave deficits in civilian capacities, specifically 
joint strategic planning and the ability to set prior-
ities. This hampers or prevents conflict prevention, 
mediation, humanitarian aid, development coopera-
tion, post-conflict rehabilitation and the enforcement 
of sanctions. In the long term the EU actors would 
need to deal with conflicts of goals and interest, which 
is why the ongoing push for greater political/strategic 
convergence and action-readiness is so elementary. 
The EU is an important and dependable arms control 
actor. In the current climate of rearmament initia-
tives and in view of its own desire for military-backed 
autonomy it should make this visible proactively. 
Renewing its 2003 Strategy Against Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction would fit with that line. 
That could include a European initiative for a non-
proliferation fund to compensate politically motivat-
ed non-payments of major powers. As part of a policy 
directed towards greater independence Europe can 
also bring its economic power into play to achieve 
non-proliferation goals. For example it could press 
for non-proliferation clauses to be reintroduced in 
trade and cooperation agreements. A much more 
crucial aspect is the need for shared arms export 
standards for defence projects organised through 
PESCO and financed via the EU Defence Fund. The 
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sensitivity of this question has been demonstrated 
recently by the case of arms exports to Saudi Arabia. 
Despite coordination between them, Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom have responded very differ-
ently to the war in Yemen and the murder of a Saudi 
journalist. 
The EU’s strongest trump cards for strategic 
autonomy are its economic strength, a competition 
policy that is effective beyond the EU’s borders, and 
technological innovation. The Union would be con-
siderably more conflict-ready if it expanded the role 
of the euro as a reserve currency. In order to stabilise 
the euro zone in the long term it is vital that Berlin 
and Paris find compromises over contested reform 
projects that are acceptable for the entire EU. This 
involves questions such as shared liability in the 
banking union, the introduction of automatic stabil-
isers in the euro zone and adjustments to the export-
heavy German economic model. 
The objective of strategic autonomy also challenges 
the EU’s integration model across all policy areas. 
Where this concerns policies that are closely bound 
up with the single market, such as trade or digital 
regulation, the EU can and should only decide collec-
tively. In other areas such as the international role of 
the euro – and also military cooperation – the EU 
will only be able to make ambitious progress in the 
context of groups of willing states. 
Fifthly: A development towards greater strategic autonomy 
is sensitive for Germany, because it would force Berlin 
into course-setting decisions requiring modification 
of its traditional policy positions towards Europe. It 
will become increasingly difficult for Berlin to pursue 
its preferred middle way, already in view of French 
proposals for greater integration (in the EMU) and 
exclusive security cooperation. So strategic autonomy 
is not the magic word to bridge still less resolve the 
traditional differences and conflicts between Paris 
and Berlin. If strategic autonomy were advanced as 
a purely Franco-German project that would be more 
likely to endanger than strengthen the cohesion of 
the EU. Germany has its place in the centre of the EU 
on the strength of its location, history and interests 
and works to expand common ground among as 
many member states as possible. This requires Ger-
many itself to move back more strongly from the 
margins to the centre on questions such as deepening 
the EMU. The easier German positions are to dovetail 
with others, the more strongly Germany can also 
determine where the centre position lies. In a context 
of strategic autonomy and the search for support 
from other EU states in foreign policy and security 
questions Germany would for example be forced to 
(re)consider reform of the EMU, its trade surpluses 
and projects like Nord Stream 2. 
The decisive initiatives for the EU’s 
internal leadership will have to come 
from Paris and Berlin. 
The decisive initiatives for the EU’s internal leader-
ship will have to come from Paris and Berlin. In light 
of Brexit and the current EU policies of Poland and 
Italy, France and Germany represent the EU’s only 
political power centre. Especially if one understands 
strategic autonomy as considerably broader than its 
military aspects, the goal of ability to lead in the EU 
is especially suited for a Franco-German initiative. 
This includes an ambitious enhancement of the inter-
national role of the euro and the Single Market as 
well as cooperation on military capabilities and civil-
ian crisis management. That would demand a great 
deal of the two countries and the other EU states. 
Sixthly: A development towards greater strategic autonomy 
can already be advanced in 2019/20 by German and Euro-
pean decision-makers. The political calendar offers a 
number of opportunities: 
(1) Germany could treat its non-permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council as explicitly European. That 
would mean for example engaging especially in con-
flict prevention and mobilising European resources. 
(2) Wherever possible and without harm to EU in-
tegration, the EU should cooperate with the UK after 
Brexit, so that Europe can assert its full weight under 
the motto “EU plus like-minded”. 
(3) At the meeting of the European Council in Sibiu 
in May 2019 the twenty-seven member states should 
demonstrate the perspectives of a strategically autono-
mous Europe and outline the steps required within 
the EU framework, the costs, the expected benefits, 
and the alternatives. It should also be clearly commu-
nicated that strategic autonomy cannot be reduced to 
a military dimension. 
(4) The elections to the European Parliament repre-
sent an opportunity to speak with citizens about 
European self-assertion/sovereignty under conditions 
of interdependency, global connectivity and growing 
vulnerability, as well as the prospects of greater pros-
perity and better environment and life chances. 
Opening the national debates for these questions is 
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especially important for reasons of legitimacy if the 
Foreign and Security Policy permits ever fewer veto 
possibilities and national opt-outs. The appointment 
of a new Commission and other key functions in 2019 
should be used to set a course that takes up the 
aspects of strategic autonomy discussed here. 
(5) Strategic autonomy must be based on adequate 
resources to permit projects to be realised. The nego-
tiations about the Multiannual Financial Framework 
offer a possibility to match spending priorities and 
funding criteria to the requirements of strategic 
autonomy. To date there have only been the smallest 
moves in this direction, such as the EU Defence Fund 
and a moderate increase in the external relations 
budget. But in principle the budget structure remains 
completely anachronistic, a situation to which Ger-
many also contributes. 
(6) In Germany a public debate about strategic 
autonomy could connect with the broad-based dis-
cussion about assuming greater foreign policy and 
security responsibility in Europe and the world. 
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Abbreviations 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BRI Belt and Road Initiative 
CETA Comprehensive Economic and  
Trade Agreement 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
EC European Community 
ECB European Central Bank 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union 
EP European Parliament 
EPC European Political Cooperation 
EU European Union 
EU-SC European Security Council 
Fed Federal Reserve (United States) 
G-20 Group of Twenty 
G-7 Group of Seven 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IS “Islamic State” 
ISS International Space Station 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OSCE Organisation for Security and  
Cooperation in Europe 
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
UN United Nations 
UN-SC UN-Security Council 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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